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A previous article in this law review explained the rationale and structure of
the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) based on diagnosis related groups
(DRGs).' That article made some predictions concerning likely effects of the system
and possible future developments. This article, written a little under two years after
first implementation of PPS/DRG in October 1983, assesses the system in terms
of the stated goals for the program and offers possible remedies for some of the
problems which have arisen.
PPS/DRG has only recently been implemented for all the hospitals it was
originally intended to cover, 2 and the system will not be fully operational until
completion of a phase-in period.3 Moreover, empirical data on the impact of
PPS/DRG is still sparse at best, and much of the evidence is anecdotal and in-
formal in nature. Consequently, many of the conclusions and opinions expressed
in this article are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, some basic themes and issues
t This article was funded by a grant from the Frances Lewis Law Center.
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University; B.S., Wheeling College, 1962; J.D.,
Georgetown University, 1965; LL.M., Harvard University, 1966.
** Associate, Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, Providence, R.I.; A.B., Brown University, 1980; J.D.,
Washington & Lee University, 1985.
*** Research Assistant, Frances Lewis Law Center; B.A., State University of New York at Albany,
1983; J.D. (candidate), Washington & Lee University, 1986.
' Philipps & Wineberg, Medicare Prospective Payment: A Quiet Revolution, 87 W. VA. L. REV.
13 (1984). Hereinafter the prospective payment aspect of the system will be referred to as PPS. The
diagnosis related group aspect will be referred to as DRG. The combined system will be referred to
as PPS/DRG.
2 PPS/DRG first became effective on Oct. 1, 1983, Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub.
L. No. 98-21, § 601(e), 97 Stat. 149, 153 (1983), codified at 42 USC § 1395ww (1983). See note 3
infra for a description of PPS/DRG's phase-in.
Medicare is gradually phasing in PPS/DRG over three years. This transition is in two parts.
The first part is a progressive realignment away from a price based upon the hospital's individual history,
the hospital-specific portion, to a price based upon a national standard (federal portion). For hospital
fiscal years ending between September 30, 1984 and September 29, 1985, the payment is 75% hospital-
specific portion and 25% federal portion. For hospital fiscal years ending between September 30, 1985
and September 29, 1986, the payment is 50% hospital-specific portion and 50% federal portion. For
hospital fiscal years ending between September 30, 1986 and September 29, 1987, the payment is 25%
hospital specific portion and 75% federal portion. Beginning with hospital fiscal years ending after
September 30, 1987 the payments will be 100% federal portion. See 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d) (1983); the
following table from PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, TECHNICAL APPENDIXES TO THE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SER-
VICES 7 (April 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as PRoPAC APPEND.] illustrates the phase-in of the federal
portion:
1
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are emerging in the non-legal literature, and it appears useful to air them in a general
legal journal at this time as a basis for further evaluation by the larger legal
community.
II. EFFECTS AND ISSUES
In its 1982 report to Congress on PPS/DRG the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) predicted that the new payment system "will provide
hospitals an incentive to improve efficiency, will establish Medicare as a prudent
Hospital
Hospital-Fiscal Federal Specific
Year Ending Portion Portion
1 9/30/84 to 9/29/85 25% 75%
2 9/30/85 to 9/29/86 50% 50%
3 9/30/86 to 9/29/87 75% 25%
4 9/30/87 to 9/29/88 1000Y0
The second part of the transition is a shift from a regional adjusted DRG prospective payment
rate to a national adjusted prospective payment rate. For hospital discharges from October 1, 1983
through September 30, 1984 the rate is 100% regional. For discharges from October 1, 1985 through
September 30, 1986, the rate is 50% regional and 50% national. Discharges after September 30, 1986
are, at the time this is written, scheduled to be 100% federal. See 42 U.S.C. 1395 ww(d) (1983). However,
proposals currently being considered would freeze the rate blend at 50% regional and 50% national.
See, e.g., S. 1400, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. S9096 (July 9, 1985)
(Sen. Proxmire). The following table from ProPAC Append., at 7 illustrates the transition to the na-
tional rate:
Regional National
Federal Fiscal Year Rate Rate
I Discharges during Oct. 1,
1983-Sept. 30, 1984 ..... 100%
2 Discharges during Oct. 1,
1984-Sept. 30, 1985 ..... 75% 25%
3 Discharges during Oct. 1,
1985-Sept. 30, 1986 ..... 50% 50o00
4 Discharges after Sept. 30,
1986 ............... 100%
The Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (ProPAC), upon whose report the above data
is based, was created by the PPS/DRG legislation. Pub. No. 98-21, § 601(e), 97 Stat. 159, codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1395 ww(e)(2) (1983). Every April 1, ProPAC must present a written recommendation
concerning the annual increase in DRG prices. Moreover, in 1986, and at least every four years thereafter,
the April 1 report must also review the individual DRGs' weights and categories. See 97 Stat. 157;
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, First Report on the Prospective Payment Assessment Coninis-
sion, at 3 (1985). [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT].
[Vol. 88
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MEDICARE
buyer of hospital services, will reduce the administrative burden on hospitals, and
will assure beneficiary access to quality health care." ' 4 Of these goals it appears
that PPS/DRG has indeed provided hospitals with an incentive to improve effi-
ciency and made Medicare a more prudent buyer of hospital services, if by that
is meant a buyer of less at lower prices. That PPS/DRG has accomplished the
other two goals-reducing the administrative burden on hospitals and assuring access
to quality health care-is considerably more controversial.
A. Efficiency Incentive and Prudent Buyer of Hospital Services
The first two stated goals will be treated together, since they are closely inter-
related. Both aim toward the ultimate goal of Medicare cost containment. There
can be little doubt that PPS/DRG has been largely successful in attaining its goal
of Medicare cost containment. Moreover, PPS/DRG has probably contributed to
a slowing down of cost rises in the medical care system as a whole. This is not
surprising when one considers that the incentives in PPS/DRG are basically in the
direction of cost cutting. Medicare pays the hospital a prospectively determined
price per discharge based on the diagnosis classified according to DRG. If costs
exceed that price, the hospital loses money; if costs are less than that price, the
hospital makes money. Since the price is fixed, the way to turn a profit, or at
least break even, is to cut costs.
1. Reduction in Hospital Utilization
The available statistics indicate that hospitals have been cutting costs since the
inception of PPS/DRG. How much of this phenomenon is attributible to PPS/DRG
and how much to other factors such as a slowing in the rate of general inflation
is not known. However, a substantial part is undoubtedly due to PPS/DRG, since
it is consistent with the cost cutting incentives of PPS/DRG.5
One solid indicator of hospital costs is the average length of stay (LOS) per
hospital discharge. This is because LOS is closely related to hospital costs-the
longer the stay, the higher the cost of that stay is likely to be.6 On this basis costs
have been cut drastically. The average LOS per Medicare discharge in pre-PPS/DRG
fiscal year 1983 was 9.5 days. The average LOS per PPS/DRG discharge in fiscal
year 1984 was 7.5 days, a decrease of 21 percent.7 It, therefore, appears that medical
' UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HumaN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS: HOSPITAL PROS-
PECTIVE PAYMENT FOR MEDICARE (1982) at 1 [hereinafter cited as PPS REPORT].
See ProPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 52.
Id. at 52.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EVALUATING THE IMPACTS
OF MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ON PosT-HosPrrAL LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES: PRELIMINARY REPORT
(GAO/PEMQ-85-8 at 4 (Feb. 21, 1985)) [hereinafter cited as GAO PPS/DRG REPORT]; reprinted in
1985]
3
Philipps et al.: Meeting the Goals of Medicare Prospective Payments
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
care providers have reacted sharply to PPS/DRG by reducing average LOS
substantially.
This, of course, is precisely what PPS/DRG was expected to accomplish. More
surprising, however, is that admissions to hospitals have also declined., At the in-
ception of PPS/DRG, fears were expressed that the system might result in an in-
crease in admissions as physicians and hospitals attempted to compensate for a
decline in LOS by increasing the volume of patients.9 This seemed especially likely
in view of the fact that physicians are still paid on a fee-for-service basis for inpa-
tient hospital care while hospitals are paid under PPS/DRG. Physicians, who do
the admitting, would have a real incentive to increase the volume of admissions
and in the process increase their fees.' 0 In fact, however, both overall admissions,
and admissions of patients over 65 years of age have declined since the advent
of PPS/DRG." Moreover, the trend appears to have accelerated as more hospitals
came under PPS/DRG in 1984.12
The reasons for the decrease in admissions patterns are speculative. However,
several reasons have been put forth. First, a general cost consciousness among all
payors for medical services has resulted in attempts to restrict admissions to those
where inpatient treatment is truly necessary. For example, many corporate health
plans now either require or pay higher reimbursement for out-patient performance
Sustaining Quality Health Care Under Cost Containment: Joint Hearing before the House Select Com-
mittee on Aging and the Task Force on the Rural Elderly of the Select Committee on Aging, at 101,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The average LOS per PPS/DRG discharge was up slightly to 7.6 days
for the first five months of fiscal year 1985. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HCFA BACKGROUND
PAPER at 2 (June 1985).
PRoPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 53-54.
See, e.g., Wennberg, McPherson, and Caper, Will Payment Based on Diagnosis-Related Groups
Control Hospital Costs?, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 295 (1984). These concerns were supported by the
New Jersey experience with its PPS/DRG system. See Stern & Epstein, Institutional Responses to Pros-
pective Payment Based on Diagnosis-Related Groups: Implications for Cost, Quality, and Access, 312
NEw ENG. J. MED. 621, 625 (1985).
10 Physicians, on the average, generate more revenue per hour by dispensing care to hospital
inpatients than by office visits. STAFF OF SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG. 2D SESS.,
MEDICARE: PAYING THE PHYSICIAN-HIsTORY, ISSUES & OPTIONS, at 22 (Comm. Print 1984).
" PROPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 53-54.
" Id. The following table illustrates the long-term trends in admissions.
[Vol. 88
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of certain surgical procedures such as tonsillectomies and cataract removal,' 3 and
most provide for second opinions in the case of many surgical procedures." In
addition, many more health plans are requiring payment of at least a part of the
cost of health care (co-payment) by the recipient in the form of a deductible, coin-
surance, or both.'"
With respect to Medicare at least two additional elements appear to be related
to the decline in admissions. First, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the
Admissions Pattern Monitoring System designed to review discharges for every
hospital to determine if there has been a substantial increase in number of hospital
discharges as compared to a previous period.' 6 Second, contracts with Utilization
Trends in Utilization
Percent Change in Admissions
All Admissions Age 65 + Age 65 + Admissions
Year Admissions Per 1000 Pop. Admissions Per 1000 Pop.
1970 6.26% 5.93% 2.61% 0.43%
1971 0.04 -1.26 3.40 1.11
1972 2.56 1.36 6.15 3.83
1973 3.50 2.48 5.72 3.24
1974 3.70 2.73 6.01 3.43
1975 0.30 -0.69 4.50 1.59
1976 3.36 2.36 7.02 4.35
1977 2.52 1.50 4.38 1.69
1978 0.45 -0.61 4.88 2.26
1979 2.66 1.08 5.28 2.63
1980 2.89 2.44 6.70 4.32
1981 0.85 -0.45 3.03 0.90
1982 0.05 -0.93 4.08 1.87
1983 -0.55 1.50 4.74 2.60
1984 (9 mos) -3.90 -4.89 -2.70 -5.40
Id. at 54.
," See THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE TASK FORCE ON HEALTH, CORPORATE HEALTH CARE COST
MANAGEMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVE, 18-20 (1984) [hereinafter cited as BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE];
Colburn, Hospital Use Drops Sharply, Wash. Post, May 24, 1985, at 7, col. 1.
'4 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 13, at 18-20. See generally, Herzlinger and Schwartz, How
Companies Tackle Health Care Costs: Part I, HARv. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1985, at 69; Herzlinger
and Schwartz, How Companies Tackle Health Care Costs: Part 11, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1985,
at 108.
" Id. at 24-28. A deductible requires that the recipient pay all of some floor amount of the cost
of care, such as the first $300. Coinsurance requires that the recipient pay a given percentage of the
cost of care after the deductible amount has been reached. The standard percentage is set by many
plans at 20%. Id. at 26.
.6 42 C.F.R. § 412.45 (1985). For the first three quarters this system was in effect 1,446 hospitals
came under review. Of these 54% required no action, 31% required corrective action and 15% were
still under review. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AMA's DRG
MONITORING PROJECT AND THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM at 2 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 5
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and Quality Peer Review Organizations (PROs) have been entered into by HCFA
under statutory authorization' 7 to monitor utilization and quality practices of
Medicare providers. HCFA has placed emphasis on controlling admissions in for-
mulating requirements for these PRO contracts. 8 Both of these mechanisms have
apparently caused physicians and hospitals to be cautious about making what might
be deemed "unnecessary" or "inappropriate" admissions."
Shorter LOS and decreased admissions have obviously resulted in lower costs
for health care in general"0 and Medicare in particular.2" Although some of the
AMA MONITORING PROJECT]. HCFA is currently proposing to replace the system set out in 42 C.F.R.
§ 412.45 (1985) with more efficient simplified procedures. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,379 (June 10, 1985).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1320c-12j; 42 C.F.R. § 462.100-107 (1984). Congress established the
Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review (PRO) Program by amending Part B of Title XI of the
Social Security Act. The PRO Program replaced the Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO)
program. Both programs concern local peer review and standard setting. Under the PSRO program
each PSRO had to be nonprofit and have at least 25% of the area physicians as members. A PRO
may operate for profit and need have only 10% (in some cases less) of the area physicians as members.
PSROs received annual grants. PRO contracts with the Secretary of HHS are biennial. Each PRO
must state goals to be accomplished over the two year contract. PSROs were not required to do this.
A PRO sanction against an unsatisfactory provider becomes valid unless the HHS Secretary orders
to the contrary within 120 days of the report's submission. A PSRO sanction had to be validated by
the Secretary. PRO contracts were first awarded in the third quarter of 1984. HHS unified groups
of PSRO areas into larger PRO areas. Each state will be a separate PRO area. Each PRO will develop
its own rules and regulations. HHS's only interest is the quality of the review. HHS expects PROs
to be more cost effective than PSROs. See 48 Fed. Reg. 36,970 (1983). See generally, Dans Weiner
and Otter, Peer Review Organizations, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1131 (1985).
" See Sustaining Quality Health Care Under Cost Containment: Joint Hearing before the House
Select Committee on Aging and the Task Force on the Rural Elderly of the Select Comnmittee on Aging
88-94, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter cited as Sustaining Quality Health Care]; text accom-
panying notes 185 to 200 infra.
" See Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 23: "Where a PRO designates a par-
ticular procedure as more appropriately performed on an outpatient basis, any attempt to hospitalize
a patient for that procedure must be clearly documented or payment will be denied." (Statement of
Louis Krieger, Chairman of New York State Legislative Committee of American Association of Retired
persons.) Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(f) (1983), (when HCFA or PRO determine hospital admission is
unacceptable payment will be denied).
10 The following table illustrates the trend in Medical Care Prices during the 1980s:
Percent Change in Selected Components of
Consumer Price Index, 1980-1984 Annual Averages
CPI, all Medical
CPI items less care Hospital Physicians'
all items medical care total room services
1980 13.5 13.6 10.9 13.1 10.6
1981 10.4 10.3 10.8 14.8 11.0
1982 6.1 5.9 11.6 15.7 9.4
1983 3.2 2.9 8.7 11.3 7.7
1984 4.3 4.1 6.2 8.3 7.0
J. REUTER, Health Care Expenditures and Prices, Cong. Research Service Issue Brief IB77066
at CRS-5 (updated 3/1/85).
2, See PRoPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 52-54; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS,
[Vol. 88
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diminished pressure on health care prices can be attributed to a slowing in the general
rate of inflation in the past few years, a substantial part of the decrease is the
result of measures in the health care sector itself, leading to lower rates of hospital
utilization and concomitant lower costs.22
2. Reduction in Employment by Hospitals
Declines in hospital utilization have led to reduced employment by hospitals.
The number of full-time equivalent of persons (FTE) employed by hospitals had
historically grown at a rate of about four percent per year.23 Growth in FTE began
to slow down in 1982 and became negative in 1984.24 The decline in FTE was not
as rapid, however, as the decline in LOS and admissions, probably because of a
normal lag time between hospital census declines and employment reductions.25 This
suggests that FTE will decline even further in the future.
A recent survey by the American Nurses Association indicates that the decline
in FTE has affected various classes of hospital employees differently. Most
respondents to the survey believed that a shift toward greater use of registered nurses
as opposed to other nursing staff has been occurring. 26 The shift toward greater
reliance on registered nurses has resulted mainly from attrition of other categories
of employees such as licensed practical nurses and nurses' aides.27 In addition, forty
percent of the respondents reported a reduction in hours and budgeted positions.28
The survey's summary indicates that, "These developments are almost certainly
a consequence of the decline in census reported by 82% of respondents, 40% of
whom identify reduced census as being 'primarily due to Medicare' changes involving
prospective pricing and DRGs.
' 29
It is well documented, therefore, that PPS/DRG has at least helped to bring
about a situation in which physicians and hospitals are acting to reduce the costs
of inpatient hospital care. This is reflected in new optimism (or at least diminished
pessimism) over the state of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund through which
Medicare Part A30 is financed. Prior projections indicated that the fund could be
99TH CONG., IST SESS., MEDICARE, HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES, AND THE ELDERLY 17-19 (Comm.
Print 1985) [hereinafter cited as MEDICARE, HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES].
22 See Virts & Wilson, Inflation and the Behavior of Sectoral Prices, Bus. Econ., May 1983, at 45.
23 PRoPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 53.
24 Id.
I' d.
26 CENTER FOR RESEARCH, AMERICAN NURSES' ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF SURVEY TO
ASSESS THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PRICING SYSTEM, at 1 (January, 1985) [hereinafter cited
as ANA SURVEY]. The survey was sent to 384 members of the American Nurses' Association Council
on Nursing Administration. Fifty percent or 193 of those surveyed returned the questionnaire. Of these,
118 were included in the analysis. Those responses not included were from respondents who work in




30 42 U.S.C.A. § 13951 (,Vest 1983). Medicare consists of two programs: Hospital Insurance (Part
A) and Supplementary Medical Insurance (Part B). Part A basically covers inpatient hospital services,
1985]
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depleted as early as 198 8.3' Now the Congressional Budget Office predicts that
exhaustion of the trust fund may be postponed until the mid-1990s,"2 and some
knowledgeable officials believe the date of exhaustion may be pushed back as far
as the end of the century.
33
All the foregoing developments indicate that PPS/DRG has had a substantial
effect in lowering Medicare inpatient hospital costs by providing hospitals with in-
centives to become more efficient and thereby making Medicare a "more prudent
purchaser" of hospital inpatient services. Undoubtedly, in this respect, PPS/DRG
has so far proven to be a marked improvement over the old system of retrospective
cost reimbursement. Nevertheless, PPS/DRG is still new and to a degree experimen-
tal. As might have been expected, complaints have arisen about the system. These
largely involve problems concerning PPS/DRG's two other stated goals-reducing
the administrative burden on hospitals and assuring access to quality health care.
In addition, the system's failure to provide a mechanism for appeal of the DRG
rates set by HHS has caused concern to some. The validity of these complaints
is difficult to assess at this stage. However, they are of sufficient gravity that those
concerned with health care should give them serious consideration and act to remedy
those that are valid where that is possible.
B. Reducing the Administrative Burden on Hospitals
The publicly available evidence of the extent to which PPS/DRG has
accomplished this goal is sparse. Administration of Medicare (and other third par-
ty payment mechanisms) has always presented an administrative problem for
hospitals, and the degree to which PPS/DRG has either increased or lightened that
burden is unclear.
1. Record-Keeping and Discharge Planning
Some administrative functions almost certainly require increased input under
PPS/DRG. For example, medical records must have a high degree of accuracy
skilled nursing facility services, and certain home health services. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395a (West 1983).
Part A is financed by compulsory payroll taxes earmarked for the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395g (West 1983). Medicare Part B is a voluntary insurance plan designed to
cover the cost of independent practitioners (primarily physicians), outpatient hospital services, laboratory
services, and other medical and related services. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395k (West 1983). It is financed partly
by general federal revenues and partly by premiums paid by enrollees. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395t (West 1983).
Almost all persons enrolled under Part A are also enrolled under Part B. K. Davis & D. Rowland,
Reforming Medicare: A New Approach to Financing 121, 122 (1983); reprinted in STAFF OF HousE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PROCEEDINGS AND PRELIMINARY PAPERS OF Til
CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE (Comm. Print. 1983).
11 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL HOSPIAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT: FEDERAL
HOSPITAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND at 43.
32 MEDICARE, HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 23.
" Rich, Hospital Fund for Medicare is Now Sound, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
[Vol. 88
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if the hospital is to receive proper reimbursement under PPS/DRG. This requires
increased and more skilled personnel in the medical records department. 34 In addi-
tion, it appears that many hospitals have found it necessary to upgrade their data
processing equipment in order to monitor physician admission and discharge prac-
tices, and profitable and unprofitable DRGs. Some hospitals have gone so far as
to appoint a "DRG Coordinator" to monitor compliance with the system.35
Another area of increased need is discharge planning. If patients are in fact
being discharged earlier than in the past, as lower LOS indicates, it becomes more
important that they be properly prepared and placed in appropriate settings upon
their discharge.",
New Jersey's PPS/DRG system has been in place longer than Medicare's. A
survey of that state's hospitals on the impact of its PPS/DRG system (a prototype
for Medicare PPS/DRG) found a consensus that the system had increased
administrative costs.3 7 At least some of this increase might be explained, however,
by the fact that New Jersey's system applies to all payors, resulting in greater com-
plexity in administering that system.
None of these results is unexpected, given the nature of PPS/DRG and its
inherent incentives. Moreover, implementation of any new system is bound to result
in new costs as the system starts up. The real question is whether these costs will
be counterbalanced over time by increased efficiencies that the new procedures bring
about and by elimination of costs associated with the old system. For example,
it may be possible to eliminate some detailed cost accounting and audit procedures
required by the old cost reimbursement system as PPS/DRG moves toward stan-
dardized nationally established DRG prices. 8
1' In the ANA survey 87% of the respondents reported increased emphasis on medical records
at their hospitals and 65% attributed this increased emphasis to PPS/DRG. ANA SURVEY, supra note
26, Table 4.
" See Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 26 (Testimony of Pat Hanson, Hospital
DRG Coordinator); Stern & Epstein, supra note 9, at 624.
36 See text accompanying notes 56 to 79 infra. In the ANS Survey 91% of the respondents reported
increased emphasis on discharge planning at their hospitals and 68% attributed that increased emphasis
to PPS/DRG. ANA SURVEY, supra note 26, Table 4.
" New Jersey's Hospital Reimbursement System, Hearing before the House Select Committee
on Aging, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 1983 [hereinafter cited as New Jersey's Hospital Reimbursement System]
(statement of Dr. Alfred Alessi, Past President Medical Society of New Jersey and Cochairman, Medical
Society DRG Evaluation Committee):
A broad consensus exists that the system has increased management, and cost due to manage-
ment, data processing, medical records, fiscal and patient billing costs, and a need for addi-
tional staff at each hospital certainly has occurred.
Id. at 18.
It is reported that in New Jersey the personnel required in medical records departments has in-
creased by an average of 3.3 FTE. Stern & Epstein, supra note 9, at 624.
" See Sustaining Quality Health Care supra note 18, at 65 (Statement of Ben White, Hospital
Administrator). It may also be possible to replace the current overly cumbersome system for establishing
the right to cost outlier (a hospital stay that is atypical because of unusually high costs) payments. Id.
19851
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2. Physician-Hospital Relationship
Another administrative problem facing hospitals under PPS/DRG is the chang-
ing relationships between hospitals and their physician staff. Hospital administrators
have traditionally deferred to physician staff on medical decisions and also other
decisions that involve hospital management."' The onset of PPS/DRG, among other
things, has forced hospital administrators to rework this relationship and assume
a more assertive role.4" As PPS/DRG has made hospital administrators more cost
conscious by putting financial pressure on them, they have responded by assuming
a more active role in monitoring physician practices. A physician whose patients
regularly have LOS beyond the DRG average is likely to be informed by the hospital
administration that this is occurring. If his practices persist, there may be attempts
at moral suasion and, in egregious cases, threat of loss of privileges.4
Many physicians are understandably unhappy about such developments. In a
recent survey by the American Medical Association (AMA), forty-one percent of
respondents reported a deterioration in relations between physicians and hospital
management, thirty-one percent reported no change, and twenty-eight percent
reported an improvement in relations."' Hospital administrators have taken action
to ease the strain in relations brought on by PPS/DRG. Among the steps reported
are: providing individual physicians with profiles of their costs of treating patients;
seeking suggestions from physicians on ways to control costs; developing a DRG
committee comprised of physicians, administrators, nurses, and other personnel
to identify cost-saving measures; investigating practice patterns of physicians deemed
"DRG winners" to understand better the reasons for their positive financial impact;
and providing extensive medical staff education in implementation of PPS/DRG.4 2
Such measures have been viewed favorably by physicians and should help con-
siderably in making the transition to the new system.
44
C. Assure Beneficiary Access to Quality Health Care
Whether PPS/DRG is achieving the goal of assuring beneficiary access to quality
health care is a controversial issue. This involves providing Medicare patients with
" See Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Anti-Trust Perspective on Traditional Relation-
ships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1084-1092. See generally, Angell, Cost Containment and the Physician,
254 J. AM. MED. A. 1203 (1985).
40 Id. at 1077-1078. Other factors are an increased physician supply, resulting in increased hospital
bargaining power in acquiring physician staff, and the threat of malpractice liability on the part of
hospitals for actions of physician staff. Id. at 1077-78.
See, e.g., Sustaining Quality Health Care supra note 18 at 36 (testimony of Pat Hanson, Hospital
DRG Coordinator).
"' AMA MONIroRNG PROJECT, supra note 16, at 10. Physicians have, in general, been more critical
of PPS/DRG than other groups involved in health care. See, e.g., New Jersey's Hospital Reimburse.
ment System, supra note 37, at 17-19 (statement of Dr. Alfred Alessi); Sustaining Quality Health Care
passim. See generally, Rogers, Weathering the Storm, 254 J. AM. MED. A. 1461 (1985).
,3 AMA MONITORING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 10-11.
See id. at 10.
[Vol. 88
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/6
MEDICARE
treatment appropriate to their illnesses, neither overtreating nor undertreating them,
and compensating hospitals equitably in an amount commensurate with the ser-
vices provided.
1. Appropriate Treatment
The principal questions raised so far concerning the appropriateness of treat-
ment under PPS/DRG involve allegations that patients are being discharged too
early from the hospital, that there is insufficient provision for care after hospitaliza-
tion, and that ancillary services to hospital inpatients may be reduced excessively.
In addition, there have been indications of physician dissatisfaction with PPS/DRG.
a. Early Discharge. A common criticism of PPS/DRG to date has been the
charge that it has resulted in undertreatment of patients, primarily through discharg-
ing them from the hospital before they are ready to go home.45 This criticism,
however, may be due more to misapplication of the system and lack of adequate
arrangements for care following hospitalization than to defects inherent in PPS/DRG
itself.
A report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) to Senator John Heinz,
Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, expressed concern that "some
discharges from the hospital may be premature. ' 4 6 Senator Heinz concluded from
this report that Medicare patients are being discharged "quicker and sicker." 7 An
informal non-scientific survey of StateLong-Term Care Ombudsmen by Represen-
tative Mike Synar, Chairman of the Task Force on the Rural Elderly of the House
Select Committee on Aging, reached conclusions similar to those of the GAO.
Seventy-five percent of those responding to Representative Synar's survey said
patients are being discharged "sicker" or "much sicker" than before PPS/DRG. 8
The AMA survey, discussed above, reported that sixty-three percent of the respon-
dents stated that quality of care had deteriorated or that it would deteriorate over
time if PPS/DRG remained in effect. 9 Pressure on physicians by hospital ad-
" See e.g., Sustaining Quality Health Care supra note 18, at 119 (Letter from Lynn K. Klobuchar,
attorney for the Senior Citizens Law Project of Legal Aid Service of North Eastern Minn.); 135 (State-
ment by James Roosevelt, National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare); 139 (State-
ment by Sally Hart Wilson, staff attorney for National Senior Citizen's Law Center); Medicare DRGs:
Challenges For Quality Care, Hearing before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, passim, 99th
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985); Hull, Medicare Payment Plan is Blamed for Hasty Release of Aged Patients,
Wall St. J., June 26, 1985, at 35, col. 4.
,6 Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 102. The study was based on interviews
with representatives of health care providers (representing hospitals, home health agencies, and skilled
nursing facilities), advocate groups, health planning agencies, and PROs in six communities: Adrian,
Michigan; Corpus Christi, Texas; Orlando, Florida; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia; and
Seattle, Washington. Id. at 103.
," Press release from Sen. John Heinz, February 26, 1985.
" Sustaining Quality Health Care supra note 18, at 4 (Survey submitted by Rep. Mike Synar,
Chairman of House Select Comm. on Aging Task Force on Rural Elderly).
," AMA MONITORING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 7.
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ministrators to make early discharges was cited as one of the principal concerns
by those giving negative responses on quality of care."0 These surveys are preliminary
and do not purport to be scientific. Furthermore, the physicians responding to the
AMA survey can hardly be characterized as disinterested observers. Nevertheless,
this preliminary informatin is sufficient to cause concern, and it is obvious that
some premature discharges have occurred.
At least part of the problem appears to stem from simple ignorance. When
the DRGs and their respective weights were first published, the average LOS for
each DRG was also published." Some hospital administrators have taken this average
figure as a maximum. 2 When the patient's LOS reaches the DRG's average LOS,
they assume that the hospital is thereafter losing money and pressures to discharge
the patient increase markedly.53 It has been reported that in some instances when
the average DRG days are up, patients have been told they must leave the hospital
because "their Medicare coverage has run out." '54
These are obviously abuses of the system, but they are not the result of defects
inherent to PPS/DRG itself. Rather, they are the result of misinformation and
misapplication of PPS/DRG. The remedy is not to change the system; it is to bet-
ter inform the system's participants about how it works."
,o Id. The other principal concerns were complicated hospital stays, readmissions, and limitations
on testing. With respect to complicated hospital stays, the main concern was that when a second condi-
tion requiring treatment is diagnosed some hospitals have encouraged the physician to discharge the
patient and readmit the patient at a later date for treatment of the second condition. Id. at 7-8.
1, 48 Fed. Reg. 39, 876 (Sept. 1, 1983).
,1 AMA MONITORING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 9; Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note
18, at 25 (statement of Pat Hanson, hospital DRG coordinator); Id. at 120 (letter from Lynn K. Klobuchar,
attorney for the Senior Citizens Law Project of Legal Aid Service of Northeastern Minnesota).
11 See e.g., Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 120, (letter from Lynn K. Klobuchar,
attorney for the Senior Citizens Law Project of Legal Aid Service of Northeastern Minnesota):
A common comment made to me by Medicare recipients is that hospital staff people inform
them from day one of hospitalization when their DRG days are up. Many hospital staff
appear to feel that the average days computed for amount of payment purposes, contemplated
for any given DRG is "check out time" for every patient.
Id. at 120.
s GAO PPS/DRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
" See AMA MONITORING PROJECT, supra note 16, at 9:
It is important to clarify that the mean LOS . . . is not meant to be the absolute maximum
number of available days to treat a patient in a given DRG; rather it is a reflection of the
average number of days required for treating a patient, It is possible for a patient to be
treated and discharged in less than the mean LOS and still incur costs higher than the DRG
rate of reimbursement. It is hoped, therefore, that hospitals will analyze both LOS and utiliza-
tion of hospital resources before developing hospital policies on early discharges.
Id. at 9. The spectre of medical malpractice suits should help deter the premature discharge of hospital
patients. Physicians and hospitals who abuse the system by premature discharge of patients may receive
a painful lesson in court for patient abandonment. See Marsh, Health Care Cost Containment and
the Duty to Treat, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 178-185 (1985); Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice in
Light of Medicare Cost Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1985).
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b. Need for Aftercare. A second aspect of the early discharge problem is less
tractable. Average LOS of Medicare patients is indisputably down substantially. 6
The necessary corollary to this is that patients are in fact being discharged earlier
than they were prior to PPS/DRG. It may, therefore, be true that "patients are
being discharged from hospitals after shorter lengths of stay and in a poorer state
of health than prior to" PPS/DRG." If that is so, the questions remain: Does
this represent poorer medical practice than existed prior to PPS/DRG? Are pa-
tients being adversely affected? If so, what remedies are available?
The philosophy of the current system appears to be that a patient should be
hospitalized only when hospitalization is necessary. The basic goal is to eliminate
unnecessary utilization by monitoring admissions through PROs and HCFA's Ad-
missions Pattern Monitoring System and by providing financial incentives for earlier
discharge through the PPS/DRG mechanism. 8 However, there are patients who,
while not sick enough to require hospitalization, are also not well enough to be
at home without some form of care. If they cannot be kept in the hospital, some
form of care after hospitalization should be provided. It is here that the Medicare
system (in contrast to Medicare's PPS/DRG aspect) seems to be experiencing
difficulty.
Demand for health care following hospitalization (aftercare) appears to be on
the increase following implementation of PPS/DRG. A preliminary survey of Area
Agencies on Aging by the Southwest Long Term Care Gerontology Center of the
University of Texas Health Science Center indicated increased demand for skilled
home health care (HHC) services and support services such as home delivered meals
and housekeeping services in the post-PPS/DRG period. 9 The study also found
that persons needed skilled care at home for an increased length of time .6 These
findings support the thesis that earlier hospital discharges of hospital patients is
resulting in sicker patients demanding increased provision of aftercare services. To
the extent that Medicare patients are discharged from hospitals sooner and with
greater need for care, the demand for nursing and home health services covered
by Medicare will increase'.
6
Unfortunately, no truly effective policy for addressing Medicare patients' after-
care needs presently exists. 62 Medicare's coverage of skilled nursing facility (SNF)
6 3
,6 See supra text accompanying notes 5 to 7.
"7 GAO PPS/DRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
" See supra text accompanying notes 5 to 22.
" SOUTHWEST LONG TERM CARE GERONTOLOGY CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF DRGs AND CHANGES
IN SERVICE DELIVERY 6 (1985).
60 Id.
61 GAO PPS/DRG REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
61 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID AND NURSING HOME CARE: COST INCREASES AND THE
NEED FOR SERVICES ARE CREATING PROBLEMS FOR THE STATES AND THE ELDERLY at 1 (GAO/IPE 84-1,
October, 1983) [hereinafter cited as GAO NURSING HOME REPORT].
65 The term skilled nursing facility (SNF) refers to two distinct types of convalescent facilities
which must follow the same admission rules: the "Swing-bed Hospital" and the Skilled Nursing Facility.
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services is limited to short-term care for patients who require daily delivery of skill-
ed nursing or rehabilitative services. 6 Additionally, the patient must have been
hospitalized for at least three consecutive days prior to entering the SNF . 6  If a
patient meets the eligibility requirements for SNF care, Medicare will pay for all
approved expenses only for the first twenty days. There is a fifty dollar co-payment
per day for the following eighty days, and then no payment after that for a single
"spell of illness." ' 66 The average length of stay in an SNF for Medicare patients
was about twenty-eight days in 1983.67 Only a small percentage of total Medicare
expenditures is spent for SNF care. 68 Medicaid has become the predominant payor
for nursing home care.
69
SNFs do not appear to be filling the gap created by the earlier discharges en-
countered under PPS/DRG. HHS's own analysis indicates that a significant in-
crease in use of SNFs may be precluded by such factors as shortage of SNF beds
and reluctance of SNFs to accept Medicare patients who may become eligible for
Medicaid (at low Medicaid payment rates) when their Medicare eligibility expires.7"
The situation with respect to HHC is similar. There is an acceleration of a
trend started prior to PPS/DRG toward greater utilization of HHC,7" but stringent
eligibility requirements and lack of availability militate against its use as a substitute
for hospitalization.
72
42 U.S.C. § 1395tt(b) (1984). The SNF is distinct from the rest of the hospital, although not necessarily
a separate edifice. 42 U.S.C. 1395xa) (1984). A "Swing-bed Hospital" is a small facility, usually rural
with fifty or fewer beds. The facility must, among other things, be a qualified Medicare hospital and
substantially fulfill the requirements to be a SNF. 42 U.S.C. 1395tt(a)(l), (b)(1).
42 U.S.C. 1395d(b)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 409.31(b) (1984).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(1); 42 C.F.R. § 409.30(a)(1) (1984). The day of discharge does not count
toward the three days.
66 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2) (1984). A spell of illness begins upon the first day that the patient
receives qualified Medicare Inpatient Hospital/SNF treatment, if the patient is eligible for Medicare
coverage that month. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a)l (1984). A "Spell of Illness" ends when the patient has
been in neither a hospital nor an SNF for the previous sixty days. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(a)(2). The day
of discharge counts as a day out. RIA SOCIAL SECURITY COORDINATOR 60,433, citing SKILLED NURSING
FACILITY MANUAL § 240 (1984).
67 GAO NURSING HOME REPORT, supra note 64.
63 Id.
69 Id.
70 Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 104. See Generally, Harrington and Swan,
Medicaid Nursing Home Reimbursement Policies, Rates, and Expenditures 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV.
39 (1984).
Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 104.
Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 13-14 (statement of Pat Hanson, Hospital
DRG coordinator). See Generally, H.A. PALLEY & J.S. OKTAY, THE CHRONICALLY LIMITED ELDERLY:
THE CASE FOR A NATIONAL POLICY FOR IN-HOME HEALTH AND SUPPORTIVE COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES
(1983); FELDBLUM, Home Health Care for the Elderly: Programs, Problems, and Potentials, 22 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 193 (1985).
Several requirements must be satisfied before Medicare Hospital Insurance will pay for any care
[Vol. 88
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol88/iss2/6
MEDICARE
Clearly, provision for SNF and HHC services needs to be upgraded and liber-
alized under Medicare. Otherwise, the result will be a reduction in the quality of
medical services available to Medicare recipients and also a shift in the costs of
care for early-discharged patients to Medicaid or to "informal care providers" in
the home upon whom the burden for such care falls by default.
7
1
Congress has mandated that HCFA study and report to it on the feasibility
of extending prospective payment to SNFs. 74 The whole subject of aftercare following
hospitalization of Medicare patients should be studied. This study should include
the possibility of covering intermediate nursing facilities as well as SNFs and HHC.
Many Medicare patients being discharged earlier under PPS/DRG are likely not
to be ready to go home in the absence of some kind of professional care without
adverse effects on their health. Provision would have to be made to assure that
Medicare is in fact paying for health care services and not merely custodial care.
But that could be done without the present stringent restrictions on eligibility,
benefits, and services. 7" For example, the three day hospitalization requirement for
eligibility for SNF benefits could be eliminated, 76 and the definition of "home-
provided through Home Health Care (HHC). The patient must be confined somewhere other than a
hospital or SNF; under a physician's care; in need of intermittent nursing care; or of physical or speech
therapy. The HHC must be based upon a plan of treatment created and periodically reviewed by a
physician. 42 U.S.C. 1395f(a)2(D) (1984). The HHC must be provided or arranged by a participating
Home Health Agency (public or private). There is, currently, no prior hospitalization requirement. 42
C.F.R. § 409.42(g) (1984). At least one of the services must be furnished directly by the home health
agency. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1221(a) (1984). A home health agency must, among other things, meet HCFA
standards; comply with state regulations; maintain clinical records; be primarily involved in providing
therapy and skilled nursing; and meet administrative standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(0) (1984). Each ser-
vice is a visit even if two or more of the visits are simultaneous. 42 C.F.R. § 409.43(a) (1984). Qualified
patients are entitled to an unlimited number of fully covered visits. 42 CFR § 409.61(d) (1984).
The early discharge phenomenon is leading to some probably unanticipated results. For example,
one company is setting up and running psychiatric units (not under PPS/DRG, 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)-
(t)) (1983) in hospitals. These units presumably are fulfilling some of the need for aftercare. See We're
Filling Beds, FORBES, June 17, 1985, at 91. There is also a trend toward vertical integration of hospitals
and SNFs, either by hospitals' setting up their own SNFs or entering into contracts with SNFs to take
their discharged patients. See Nemore, Medicare Prospective Payment for Hospitals: Implications for
Nursing Home Residents, 17 Clearinghouse Review 1309 (1984).
" See Feldblum, supra note 72, at 213-15. A synonym for "informal care provider" is often
adult daughter or daughter-in-law. Id. at 215 n.132.
" Pub. L. No. 98-21 § 605(a), 98 Stat. 169 as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2319, 98 Stat.
1083 (1984). The report was originally due by December 31, 1983. That deadline was missed, reportedly
because of negative reactions to a preliminary draft by some long-term health care industry officials.
Newswatch, Report on DRG System for SNFs Delayed, Geriatric Nursing 76 (March/April 1984). The
deadline was extended to December 1, 1984 by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369
§ 2319, 98 Stat. 1083 (1984), but as of the time this is written had not yet been submitted.
," See Branch & Stuart, A Five Year History of Targeting Home Care Services to prevent Institu-
tionalization, 24 The Gerontologist 387 (1984); Birnbaum, Burke, Swearingen, & Dunlop, Implement-
ing Community-Based Long-Term Care: Experience of New York's Long Term Home Health Care
Program, 24 The Gerontologist 380 (1984).
76 See Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 14.
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bound" '77 necessary for HHC eligibility could be broadened."' In addition, other
measures should be considered. For example, it may be possible for many hospitals
to convert empty beds to swing beds for the purpose of providing SNF services. 9
c. Ancillary Services. Another, albeit less strident, complaint voiced by some
is that PPS/DRG has caused hospital administrators to pressure physicians to utilize
fewer ancillary services such as testing.80 The complaints, though, are mainly directed
at a fear of curtailment in the future rather than belief that present practices are
harmful to patients.' Thus, even among some of PPS/DRG's severest critics, this
is not perceived as a present problem, only a potential one. Nevertheless, it is a
potential problem that bears watching with respect to both quality of care and cost.
It is true that eliminating unnecessary tests, especially intrusive ones with a poten-
tial for iatrogenic effects, can actually enhance quality care while reducing costs.
However, omitting tests where they are medically appropriate can increase costs.
Such omissions do so by failing to detect medical conditions at an early stage when
they can be effectively treated in a manner less costly than if the condition is allowed
to progress. 2
d. Physician Attitudes. Overall, sixty-three percent of the respondents to the
AMA survey reported that quality of care had deteriorated or that it would
deteriorate under PPS/DRG, largely on account of the foregoing problems. 3 Some
of this reaction may simply be attributible to resentment by physicians of the disloca-
tions of a new system and intrusions of PPS/DRG into their traditional
prerogatives.8 It may, consequently, be a passing phase. However, any system of
" The "homebound" require health care to be brought to them because going to a health care
facility is too straining. Two characteristics identify the homebound: functional immobility and actual
immobility. Functionally, the individual must be genuinely impaired, (e.g., walk with a cane; have a
restrictive heart condition; be blind; be senile), not merely be old. Also, the individual must actually
be less mobile. Certainly, this is not synonymous with imprisonment. However, if Great Aunt Hannah
can get to Wednesday night bingo, she probably does not need HHC. See RIA SocIAL SECURITY COOR-
DINATOR at 62,011, citing HOME HEALTH AGENCY MANUAL § 208.4 (1984).
" Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 13-14 (statement of Pat Hanson, Hospital
DRG coordinator).
" See Hochstein, Treating Long-Stay Patients in Acute Hospital Beds: An Economic Diagnosis,
25 The Gerontologist 161 (1985).
" See AMA MoNrroRNG PROJECT, supra note 16: "There clearly seems to be a trend for hospitals
to encourage limitations on services for patients." Id. at 8.
11 Id. For example, one respondent to the AMA Monitoring Project noted in a typical response:
With the financial constraints placed upon us by the DRG system, tests will not be ordered
as frequently for screening purposes .... one need not look too far down the road to see
medical problems which will become more complicated and more difficult to manage by virtue
of the fact that they were not diagnosed earlier.
Id.
I2 d.
Id. at 7. A survey of physicians in New Jersey produced similar responses to that state's PPS/DRG
system. New Jersey's Hospital Reimbursement System, supra note 37, at 56-58.
" A survey of New Jersey hospitals on the impact of PPS/DRG elicited a considerably more
favorable response than did the physician survey. New Jersey's Hospital Reimbursement System, supra
note 37, at 53-55.
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payment which results in widespread and long-lasting physician dissatisfaction would
obviously be in trouble. The long-term reaction of physicians to PPS/DRG is not
yet clear but certainly deserves close monitoring.
2. Equitable Compensation to Hospitals
If a payment system is to assure access to quality health care over the long
term, it must pay equitable compensation to the providers of health care commen-
surate with the services provided. Therefore, it is essential that PPS/DRG be as
accurate as possible in paying compensation to hospitals that is neither excessive
nor inadequate. In this regard, PPS/DRG has been subjected to the criticism that
it has resulted in inappropriate compensation to hospitals in some instances.
a. Severity of Illness. One problem in providing equitable compensation under
PPS/DRG is that there appears to be considerable variation in resource use within
some DRGs. Even after adjustment for area wage levels, urban-rural location, and
teaching activity are made, there is concern that costs vary considerably within given
DRGs on account of factors beyond the hospital's control rather than due to the
hospital's efficiency.85 For example there may be a wide variation in costs within
a single DRG depending on the severity of the illness, and some hospitals may
tend to treat patients whose illnesses are more severe and whose costs of treatment
are therefore higher. 6
Studies have indicated that costs within a DRG do vary with severity of illness.87
While not fully accounting for cost variations within DRGs, introducing a measure
of severity does substantially reduce this variation. 8 The question is whether there
is any severity measure available which could be feasibly incorporated into the
system.
1, Memorandum, An Analysis of the Impacts of a DRG-Specific Price Blending Option for
Medicare's Prospective Payment System 2 (CBO Internal Document, Dec. 20, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Price Blending Option].
86 Price Blending Option at 2.
See Horn, Buckley, Sharkey, Chambers, Horn, & Schramm, Interhospital Differences in Severity
of Illness, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 20 (1985); Gertman & Lowenstein, Research Paradigm for Severity
of Illness: Issues for the Diagnosis Related Group System, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. ANNUAL SuPP.
79, 85 (Nov. 1984). "Severity" has two applications for use in reference to a patient in a hospital. The first
application is the severity of the damage, physical and psychological, inflicted by the patient's afflic-
tion. The second application is the affliction's material cost. Smits, Fetter & McMahon, Variation in
Resource Use Within Diagnosis-Related Groups: The Severity Issue, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. ANNUAL
SuPp. 71-72 (Nov. 1984); [hereinafter cited as Smits] Obviously, the second application is exactly the form
of severity data a case-mix system should produce. The first application, however, is the form of severity
data that hospitals can best provide. Thus, the relationship between the two applications is pivotal.
88 Horn, Horn & Sharkey, The Severity of Illness Index as Severity Adjustment to Diagnostic
Related Groups, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. ANNUAL Supp. 33 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Horn].
The following table is a study of 47 patients who were all classified within the same DRG (#75-Major
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Five systems have been put forth as severity measures: Disease Staging (Staging);
Severity of Illness Index (Indexing); Patient Management Categories (Management);
Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (Apache 11); and Medical Illness
Severity Grouping System (MEDISGRPS).9 A case-mix system should have certain
attributes. A system should accurately indicate the hospital resources each case will
require." A system should recognize clinical similarities in cases. This clinical perspec-
tive makes a system more adaptable to medical progress and more palatable to
physicians and administrators. 9' A system should not relapse into retrospective pay-
ment (fee-for-service). 2 A system should be easy to implement.93 A system should
not be prone to "gaming." 9 A system should render consistent results at different
hospitals.95
Table E
Procedure type Number Mean Coefficient
and severity level of patients Charge of variation
Total 47 S 11,684 251
Moderate operating
room procedure
Severity level 1 6 2,650 43
Severity level 2 11 6,341 52
Severity level 3 3 14,789 8
Major operating
room procedure
Severity level 1 13 5,891 38
Severity level 2 13 10,523 55
Severity level 4 1 205,747 0
Id. at 38. See also Young, Incorporating Severity of Illness and Comobidity in Case-Mix Measure-
ment, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. ANNUAL Supp. 23 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Young]. See general-
ly Smits, supra note 87, at 7). See Horn, supra note 87 at 20.
" See generally, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. ANNUAL SuPP. (Nov. 1984). (This issue is a collection of
several important articles on case-mix systems.) HCFA has expressed interest in further research on
such systems. See 50 Fed. Reg. 4483 (1985).
9' Jencks, Dobson, Willis & Feinstein, Evaluating and Improving the Measurement of Hospital
Case-Mix, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. ANNUAL SUPP. 1, 5 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Jencks]. Resource
consumption includes diagnosis as well as treatment. Id.
91 Id.
92 ld. at 5. All five of these systems are prospective; therefore this will not be an issue in the analysis.
91 Id. at 6.
94 Id. "Gaming" refers to manipulation by the hospital of PPS/DRG to obtain more compensa-
tion without increasing efficiency. Gaming ranges from exaggerating complications to fabricating rendered
services. 1d.
91 Id. at 6-7.
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Staging, which began as a system to categorize cancer patients,9" can now be
applied to over 400 diseases. 97 Staging divides each disease9" into four stages. 99 In
the first stage there are no serious complications. In the second stage, although
the disease is still confined to a single organ or organ system, there is a meaningful
increase in the risk of complications. In stage three the disease is no longer con-
fined. Stage four is death.' 0
There is an abstract'0 ' for each patient discharged from a hospital. Staging's
software algorithm' 2 feeds on data directly from the abstract. The algorithm then
determines the "underlying conditions of highest severity."', 3 Complications are
calculated as part of the development of the disease. The system also accounts for
comorbidities (coincidental distinct diseases requiring additional resources). °'0 Stag-
ing's utility in measuring resource consumption is dependent upon the nature of
the disorder. President Reagan's cancer was archetypical of a disorder that Staging
can measure quite well. His condition was comparable to countless other colorectal
cancer patients past and present. '
The Staging analysis of President Reagan's cancer would be simple; Staging
would have done a poor job, however, with the 1981 assassination attempt. Bullets
can be unique in their destructive paths. This lack of adaptability to trauma cases
is Staging's weakness and indicates the advantage of a clinical perspective where
6 Conklin, Lieberman, Barnes and Louis, Disease Staging: Implications for Hospital Reimburse-
ment and Management, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. ANNUAL SuPP. 13, 14 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Conklin]. The National Cancer Institute conceived the staging classification system. The National
Center for Health Services Research funded the cultivation of that system into a reimbursement system. Id.
9' Id. at 15.
9' The colloquial definition of "disease" is not synonymous with the medical definition. Most people
do not consider a fractured rib a disease. However, the medical profession defines "disease" as "an inter-
ruption, cessation, or disorder of body functions, systems or organs." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
403 (5th unabr. Law. ed. 1982). Therefore, laymen must be careful not to read unintended meanings
into words such as "illness" or "disease." For example, Dr. William M. Chop of the University of
Oklahoma at Tulsa Medical College, in a recent letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association,
demonstrated the versatility of the word "disease" in one particular sentence: "any disease from
Hemophilia to otitis media to hip fractures. "Letters, 254 J.A.M.A., 503, 505 (1985).
"' Conklin, supra note 96, at 14.
0 Id. Generally each disease will have its own unique substages. Stage one, two, and three each
represent progressive severity and therefore, presumably, progressive resource consumption. A stage
4 patient (expired before discharge) will generally consume less than a stage three patient. Id.
at 14.
"I1 The abstract is the Uniform Hospital Discharge Data Set, (U.H.D.D.S.). The U.H.D.D.S.
describes the patient, the patient's illness, the patient's condition upon discharge, and where the patient
went when discharged, (home, SNF, etc.). Jencks supra note 90, at 1.
"I7 "Algorithm" is a term often used in computer science. An algorithm is a method for com-
pleting a task; often the blueprint for a computer program. SEDGEWICK, ALGoRITHI is (1985). For example,
"a + b = c" would be an algorithm for adding two numbers.
'o' Conklin, supra note 96, at 15.
Id. at 16.
o Stoler, What the Diagnosis Means, Time Mag., July 29, 1985, at 22-23.
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patients are evaluated individually. Staging's strength is full automation. This deters
gaming, facilitates implementation, and fosters uniformity in application and result.
Indexing calculates for each discharged patient a severity score based on seven
factors: disease stage; complication of the primary condition; comorbidity; depen-
dency upon the hospital staff; procedures performed outside the operating room
(e.g., diagnostic tests, therapy); rate of recovery; and residual disability.'0 6 Each
of the seven factors is rated on a scale of one to four with "one" being the most
favorable score and "four" being the least favorable.' 07 The scores are assigned
by trained individuals (raters) who judge each patient's condition in each of the
seven categories against definitions prepared by medical experts. 08 The scores are
then fed into a computer.' 9
Since Indexing considers other factors beyond disease stage, it provides more
accurate analysis of trauma cases (such as gunshot wounds). However, in order
to gain this flexibility, Indexing has sacrificed total automation. The devisers of
Indexing are confident of the raters' consistency." ' Even if the raters would be
reliable, however, they would still require training and a salary. Thus, implementa-
tion would likely be expensive and prolonged. Gaming would be a function of the
raters' integrity. The clinical quality is apparently similar to Staging.
Management's basic concept is that in any given case resource needs are best
indicated by clinical factors, severity, and comorbidity.' Management's software
is a two part algorithm."' Part One is assignment to a "key diagnosis code,"' 13
such as acute myocardial infarction (AMI)."' A patient may be assigned up to
five key diagnosis codes. These come directly from the patient's discharge abstract.
In Part Two of the algorithm the patient is assigned a Patient Management Category
(PMC) based upon The International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision,
Clinical Modication (ICD-9-CM) codes. ' Each PMC designates a clinically defined
type of case and has its own strategy. A PMC is determined by: the reason for
admission; the diagnoses; and sometimes the medical procedures performed." 6
206 Horn, supra note 88, at 33-34.
:07 Id. A score of four in Indexing is different from the fourth stage in Staging because in the
former a score of four means "catastrophic illness", id., while the fourth stage in Staging means death.
See note 100 supra.
2I Horn supra note 88, at 33-34.
109 Id. at 34.
220 Id. at 33. The devisers of Indexing, Dr. Susan Horn and her associates as Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, conducted tests on the raters and the raters demonstrated remarkable accuracy. Id.
"' Young, supra note 88, at 23. The Health Care Research Department of Blue Cross of Western
Pennsylvania developed Management under a grant from HCFA. Id.
22 Id. at 25.
123 Id.
' Id. at 26. Acute Miocardial Infarction (AMI) is the sudden destruction of an area of heart
muscle due to an insufficient blood flow. STDMAN'S MEDicAL DicroNARY at 21, 706-707. This is obviously
a broad term considering the range of possible damage. See infra, notes 117 to 121 and accompanying text.
I2" Young, supra note 88, at 23, 25. More than one code must apply for certain PMCs to be assigned.
Id. at 24.
,,6 Id. at 25-26.
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Each PMC has a cost-weight (CW)." For example, the AMI Code has 8 PMCs
ranging from congestive heart failure" 8 (CW = 41.44)"1 to "uncomplicated"
(CW = 13.71). ' The cost-weight often, but not always, parallels the death rate
(severity). Management, by concentrating on resource consumption, observes both
the cost-severity parallel and its exceptions.' 2
A PMC is also assigned to each comorbid condition. The system is alert for
apparently distinct comorbids that are actually the same disease. Often treatment
of a more serious disorder subsumes the cost of a less serious disorder.' 22
Management is the only system of the five to focus directly on cost rather than
focusing indirectly on cost through severity. This system is inherently clinically sen-
sitive. Since Management is totally automated, it is consistent, safe from gaming,
and relatively easy to implement. 2 3
The Apache II algorithm is A + B + C = Total Apache II score, where
A = Acute Physiology Score (APS); B = Chronic Health Points; and C = Age
Points.'24 APS measures severity of illness based on twelve physiological functions:
temperature; blood pressure; heart rate; respiratory rate; arterial pH; serum'25 sodium;
serum potassium; serum creatinine;' 26 hematocrit;' 27 white blood count; and Glasgow
coma score. Each function is scored. A normal function scores a zero. A function
that is too high or too low is given a score from one to four based upon absolute
distance from normal.' 28 The sum of the scores of all twelve functions is the APS.'
29
Chronic health points are given to patients who, prior to hospitalization, are
immunocompromised'3  or suffer a severe organ insufficiency.', Five points are
"' Id. at 26.
Congestive heart failure is when the heart circulates the blood so poorly that watery fluid
accumulates in the heart tissue. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 443-44, 511-12.
"I Young, supra note 88, at 26.
12' Id.
123 Id.
I2 d. at 29.
, Id. The devisers of Management do point out that flaws in ICD-9-CM restrain the effectiveness
of the system. They believe, however, that these problems can be solved. Id. at 31. See Smits, supra
note 87, at 71, 74-77.
" Wagner & Draper, Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (Apache II) and Medicare
Reimbursement, HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. ANNOT. Supp. at 91, 94 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Wagner
and Draper]. Apache II is a revision of the more complicated Apache I. Id. at 91.
,' Serum is the liquid left when the fibrin clot and blood cells are removed from the blood. STED-
MAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 1278.
26 Creatinine is an element in urine. Id. 334.
Hematocrit is the percentage by volume of blood cells in the blood. Id at 627.
323 Wagner & Draper, supra note 124, at 93-94. For example, a respiratory rate of 12 to 24 (per
minute) is a zero; 25 to 34 or 10 to 11 is a one; greater than 50 or less than 5 is a four. Id. at 93.
329 Id.
"I Immuno-comprised means the patient's immune system has been affected seriously either by
treatment (e.g., chemotherapy) or by disease (e.g., AIDS, Leukemia). Id. at 94.
"' Examples of patients with severe organ insufficiency are those requiring renal dialysis or having
serious cardiac impairment. Id.
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given to nonoperative or emergency patients and two points are given to elective
postoperative patients.'32 Age point assignments rage from zero (patients under forty-
five) to six (patients over seventy-four).' 33 The Total Apache II score is an indicator
of severity of illness and, therefore, resource cost."'
Apache II has been used only on intensive care patients. 13S With further testing,
however, this system could be highly successful. Since Apache H is fully automated
it is consistent and safe from gaming. 136 Hospital abstracts do not provide all the
information required for Apache I.'31 Beyond this added expense, (and it would
mean some otherwise unnecessary testing), the algorithm could be easily implemented.
Apache II is not as clinical as PMC, but it details a patient's condition better than
DRG.
MEDISGRPS employs a two step process.'38 First, upon admission, each patient
undergoes clinical laboratory, radiological, pathological, and physical examinations.'9
The result of these examinations are called Key Clinical Findings (KCFs). Each KCF
is rated and assigned to one of five groups numbered from zero through four. Group
zero is for normal test results. Groups one to four are for varying degrees of gravity
in abnormal test results and/or increased risk of organ failure. Group one is the
least grave; group four is the most grave.4 0
The second step is the repetition of the first step several days later.' 4 ' If any
of the patient's second KCFs are placed in group two, three or four, then the patient
is labeled "Morbid."' 4 2 Thus MEDISGRPS evaluates a case for both severity and
rate of recovery."' Research indicates that for both rate of recovery and severity
there is a parallel increase in cost.'
44
I32 d.





75 6 Id. Numbers one and four are not assigned. Id.
J' encks, supra note 90, at 2-3.
Id.
d6 . at 3.
137 Id.
"I Brewster, Jacobs & Bradbury, Classifying Severity of Illness by Using Clinical Findings, HEALTii




42 Id. Since a morbid patient must be in the second, third or fourth KCF group, the term "morbid"
is more selective than LOS. "Morbid" should not be confused with "comorbidity."
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Further analysis of MEDISGRPS will have to wait until the specifics of the
KCF clinical standards are released."' The system will rely upon technicians similar
to the Index's raters.' 46 This will make the system more difficult to implement,
more prone to gaming, and will raise questions as to the system's reliability.
In summary there is as yet no completely satisfactory severity measure for
PPS/DRG. However, significant progress is being made and several systems show
promise.
b. Nursing Cost Measure. A second problem, distinct from but related to
the severity issue in setting equitable compensation for hospitals, is that DRGs cur-
rently make no special allocation for nursing costs. In constructing DRGs an artificial
assumption was made that each DRG required the same amount of nursing care
per day.' 7 Obviously, though, this assumption cannot be true. Some DRGs are
bound to incur more nursing costs per day than others. A patient with a broken
leg may require minimal care, while a severe heart attack victim may require con-
stant monitoring, even if not in an intensive care unit. Nursing costs comprise a
large part of a hospital's budget, so failing to account accurately for such costs
introduces a substantial element of error. '
It may be feasible in the future to introduce nursing costs as a discrete element
in constructing DRG weights. There are currently many nursing-patient classifica-
tion systems currently in use by hospitals. These attempt to assess nursing time
expended on patients for each day of their hospitalization. This time is estimated
from factors such as patient characteristics, the nurse's perception of the patient's
need for care, services the patients receive, or a combination of the foregoing. 4
9
Although there is not yet any completely satisfactory method for accurately
incorporating nursing costs into PPS/DRG, some starts have been made.' 50 For
example New Jersey has experimented with a system using "relative intensity
measures" of nursing care, but the usefulness of this system for Medicare has not
been established.' 5 ' A system to incorporate nursing costs into PPS/DRG accurately
"I Id. at 107.
146 Id.
,, See PRoPAC. APPEND; supra note 3, at 86; Smits, supra Note 87, at 71.
'" It has been estimated that nursing expenses account for up to 35% of direct patient care costs
and about 50% of a hospital's non-physician personnel budget. PROPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 87.
"I Id. at 88. Hospital accreditation standards require that "The nursing department shall define,
implement, and maintain a system for determining patient requirements for nursing care on the basis
of demonstrated patient need, appropriate intervention, and priority for care." PRoPAC APPEND.,
supra note 3, at 88, quoting, JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITALS, NURSING SERVICE STANDARD 3 (1985).
,1 See Thompson, The Measurement of Nursing Intensity, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. ANNUAL SuPP.
47, 50 (1984); Caterinicchio, Relative Intensity Measures: Pricing of Inpatient Nursing Services Under
Diagnosis Related Group Prospective Hospital Payment, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 61 (1984).
"'See Thompson, supra note 150, at 50.
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might well serve as an adequate substitute for a measure of severity, since for the
most part, the more severely ill a patient is the more nursing care that patient is
likely to require.2
A measure of nursing care would also ameliorate another possible flaw in the
DRG structure: DRG compression. Because nursing costs were allocated to DRGs
on a per diem basis, it is likely that such costs are over-allocated to low cost DRGs
and under-allocated to high cost DRGs. Therefore, the payment for truly high cost
DRGs may be understated and the payment for low cost DRGs may be overstated. "
If this is true, hospitals that treat the most complex cases are being undercompen-
sated and hospitals treating simpler cases are being overcompensated relative to
one another.'" 4 This would present hospitals with the incentive to limit admissions
of higher cost DRG patients or at least limit services to them.' More precise alloca-
tion of nursing costs to DRGs would alleviate this problem.
c. Disproportionate Share Hospitals. Failure of PPS/DRG to account ade-
quately for severity of illness and for nursing costs, with resultant DRG compres-
sion, may present a special difficulty in receiving equitable payment for "dispropor-
tionate share hospitals." A disproportionate share hospital is one serving a higher
than normal percentage of low income or Medicare patients. 5 6 The Medicare statute
makes special provision for these hospitals by providing:
The Secretary shall provide for such exceptions and adjustments to the payment
amounts ... as the Secretary deems appropriate to take into account the special
needs ... of public or other hospitals that serve a significantly disproportionate
number of patients who have low income or are entitled to benefits under part
A of this title."
The rationale for this provision is the belief that costs in disproportionate share
hospitals are unavoidably higher than for other hospitals.' 8 Many argue that low
income patients tend to have more severe illnesses and require more care than other
patients in a given DRG because they wait longer to seek care and are more likely
to have secondary diagnoses and complications.' 9
HCFA failed to respond to the statutory mandate to make special provision
for disproportionate share hospitals until July of 1985 when it grudgingly pub-
," See PRoPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 89-90.
See id. at 89, citing Lave, Note on the Compression in the HCFA DRG Prices (unpublished
paper, University of Pittsburgh 1984).
See PRoPAC APPEND. at 89.
Id.
-56 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww(d)(5)(C)(i). (West Supp. 1984).
157 Id.
"' See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM/ISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO TIlE
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuAN SERVICES 37 (April 1, 1985) [hereinafter
cited as PRoPAC REPORT]; OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
,' Price Blending Option, supra note 85, at 3.
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lished regulations in the Federal Register'60 on order of a United States District
Court.' 6 ' Justice Rehnquist, acting as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit subse-
quently stayed the District Court's order to publish the regulations. 6 2 HCFA, hav-
ing published the regulations only on account of the District Court order, accor-
dingly notified the public that the regulations were revoked before they ever became
effective.' 63 Thus, disproportionate share hospitals remain without the relief con-
templated in the statute. This is a flav in the system that can and should be remedied
through the issuance of reasonable regulations. HCFA's reluctance to issue such
regulations is regrettable.
d. Price Blending. The American Hospital Association has proposed a DRG-
specific price blending approach as at least a partial remedy for the payment in-
equities associated with the foregoing problems.' 64 Under this approach each DRG
payment rate would be either the national average rate, a hospital specific rate,
or some blend of the two.'65 The exact blend would depend on how widely the
actual costs per discharge vary within each DRG. If the variation within a given
DRG is narrow the blended payment would be weighted more heavily toward the
national rate. If the variation is wide the payment would be weighted more heavily
toward the hospital-specific rate.'6 6 The rationale is that a national average rate
is more appropriate for some DRGs than for others.
Where the distribution of costs within a DRG does not vary by much, a national
average rate is appropriate. If, however, the variation within a DRG is great, the
variation may be caused by factors beyond the hospitals' control.'6 7 In that case
a uniform national rate may result in undeserved overpayments for some hospitals
and underpayments for other hospitals, depending on the relative cost variations
in the DRGs they treat.' 68 Hospitals whose case-mix shows a high percentage of
wide variation DRGs would suffer under a uniform average rate. Preliminary studies
by the Congressional Budget Office indicate that a price blending mechanism would,
on the average, result in higher reimbursement for rural hospitals and for dispropor-
tionate share hospitals than those hospitals would receive under the fully implemented
PPS/DRG system being phased in under current law.'
69
"1 50 Fed. Reg. 27,208 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (1985).
6 Redbud Hospital District v. Heckler, No. C-84-4382-MHP, Slip. op. (N.D. Cal., filed July
30, 1984), stay granted in part, denied in part, Heckler v. Redbud Hospital District, 54 U.S.L.W. 3027,
3027-28 (U.S. July 24, 1985) (No. A-32).
162 Heckler, 54 U.S.L.W. 3027, 3027-28 (U.S. July 24, 1985) (No. A-32).
61 50 Fed. Reg. 30,944 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412) (1985).
164 Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 59 (statement of James Mongan, M.D. on
behalf of the American Hospital Association); Price Blending Option, supra note 85, at 3.
161 Price Blending Option, supra note 85, at 3. There have also been proposals to blend regional
and national rates rather than move to a uniform national rate. See e.g., S. 1400, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985), supra note 3.
,66 Price Blending Option, supra note 85, at 3.
167 Id.
161 Id.
169 Id. at 13.
1985]
25
Philipps et al.: Meeting the Goals of Medicare Prospective Payments
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1986
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
Price blending is a relatively new proposal and studies concerning its effects
are preliminary and tentative. Nevertheless, if in fact some DRGs do not lend
themselves as well as others to equitable payment under a national rate, it is an
option which should be further explored. In this regard it is relevant to note that
the New Jersey PPS/DRG system takes account of this problem by automatically
classifying a large number of DRGs as outliers not subject to the prospective pay-
ment rates because of wide cost variations in these DRGs. 70 However, to the extent
that a price blending option is adopted the prospective payment incentives of
PPS/DRG will be pro tanto diminished.
e. Area Wage Index. Another aspect of PPS/DRG which has been subject
to the criticism that it results in inequitable payment to hospitals is the area wage
index. This index is used by HCFA to make adjustments to DRG payments reflect-
ing geographic differences in hospitals' employment costs.' 7' The index, based on
statistics from the Bureau of Statistics of the Department of Labor, has been
criticized on the grounds that it does not take account of differences in wages within
a given area, and does not account for variation among areas in utilization of part-
time employees.
72
The first problem occurs because all hospitals in a given metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) are lumped together for purposes of the wage adjustment. The wage
statistics for an MSA may, however, contain data from the core city, suburban
areas, and even rural areas whose wage levels differ considerably., 7 Hospitals in
core city areas generally experience costs that are significantly greater than subur-
ban hospitals within the same MSA.' 7 For example, a recent study of five
metropolitan areas found that core city hospitals had wage indexes up to twenty-
nine percent higher than suburban hospitals in the same area.'" Various reasons
account for this differential. Core city hospitals may have to pay premium wages
to attract skilled employees and also may have a higher skill level among their
employees.' 76 Undoubtedly, some of the differential is beyond the control of the
core city hospitals, yet the present wage adjustment treats them the same as the
lower wage suburban hospitals.
A similar problem exists for rural hospitals. A single index is used for all rural
hospitals within a state.' 77 However, not all rural hospitals within a state are likely
,71 See Medicare Hospital Prospective Payment System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 105, 108 (Statement of Charles F.
Pierce, Jr., Deputy Commissioner, New Jersey State Department of Health). An outlier case is one
that is reimbursed outside of PPS because of extraordinarily high costs or extrordinarily long LOS.
See OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at B-3.
42 C.F.R. § 412.62(k) (1984).
See PRoPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 7, 66.
I7 d. at 66.
174 Id.
"I Id. See 49 Fed. Reg. 257 (1984).
176 PRoPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 66.
,I Id. at 7; Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 59 (statement by John Mongan,
M.D. on behalf of the American Hospital Association). See 49 Fed. Reg. 257 (1984).
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to be facing the same labor costs. For example, a rural hospital adjacent to a
metropolitan area may actually be competing for labor in the same market as
hospitals within the metropolitan area.' Such a hospital would be inadequately
compensated by the current wage adjustment.
A second problem with the wage index is that it does not take into account
variation among areas in utilization of part-time employees.' 79 Part-time employees
weigh as heavily as full-time employees in constructing the index. An employee
working on a half-time basis would simply be treated as a low compensated
employee, even if the hourly wage were relatively high. The result of this is that
the wage adjustment in areas that use part-time employees more extensively is
artificially low.' 80
HCFA has recognized that the current wage index does contain serious limita-
tions,' 8 ' and Congress, in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, directed HCFA to
conduct a study to develop an improved index.'82 HCFA has responded by making
its own hospital wage survey and proposes to use the results to revise its DRG
payment rates. However, HCFA currently proposes to make adjustments only for
the mix of full-time and part-time employees, and does not plan to make any changes
with respect to the problem of defining hospital labor market areas.'83 The wage
index deficiencies are a serious problem'84 that is amenable to technical improve-
ment. HCFA has already taken a partial step in that direction by making adjust-
ment for the mix of full-time and part-time employees. It should now go the rest
of the way by addressing the definition of hospital labor markets.
3. Professional Review Organizations
An issue with implications both for access to quality health care and equitable
treatment of hospitals concerns the operations of PROs.' 5 The function of these
,,5 See 49 Fed. Reg. 257 (1984).
' PRoPAC APPEND., supra note 3, at 7.
J. LUNDY, PROSPECTIVE-PAYMENT FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES, CONG. RES. SERV. ISSUE
BRIEF IB83171 at CRS-19 (Updated March 3, 1985).
181 See 49 Fed. Reg. 257 (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 24,375 (1985).
8 Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2316(a), 98 Stat. 494 (1984). Congress also directed that any payment
adjustments to reflect changes in the wage index should be made retroactive to the inception of PPS/DRG.
Id. § 2316(b). This provision may cause unanticipated problems by requiring some hospitals to repay
amounts that were overpaid during the retroactive period. See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,377 (1985). Legislation
has been introduced to make the adjustments prospectively effective only. S. 1401, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1985 reprinted in 131 Cong. Rec. S9097 (July 9, 1985) (Sen. Proxmire).
See 50 Fed. Reg. 24,375-77, 24,384 (1985).
, The wage index can have a significant effect on a hospital's payment. For example, the unad-
justed federal portion of the payment for a hospital in the Pacific region for fiscal year 1985 is $1524.56.
But adjustment for the wage index would result in a federal portion of $1983.09 in San Francisco,
while a hospital in Salem, Oregon would be entitled to a federal portion of $1589.52. PRoPAC APPEND.,
supra note 3, at 7.
"I See note 17, supra for an explanation of the structure of PROs.
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organizations as set out in the statute is to serve as monitors of both hospital utiliza-
tion and the quality of hospital care.'" However, there are indications that the
function of monitoring utilization may be taking precedence over the function of
monitoring quality of care.'7
HCFA contracts with PROs are emphasizing performance objectives which lend
themselves to quantitative analysis. A HCFA spokesman has stated that, "A major
provision of the new PRO program is the use of measurable performance
objectives."' 8 For example, the contract with the Missouri PRO sets out as an
objective to "[r]educe admissions Statewide by 65,328."' 1 9 This would result in
an admissions reduction of ten percent over the two year duration of the contract. 9
Other PRO areas also have overall admissions objectives.' 91 Moreover, there are
PRO objectives for specific kinds of admission. For example, the Oklahoma PRO
has among its objectives:
Admission Objective -1, 'Reduce by 77% or 24,881 the admission for surgical
procedures which could safely and appropriately be performed as outpatient pro-
cedures.' 'Reduce by 100% or 17,748 admissions for one-to-three day stays where
one or more outpatient procedures are performed.'
Admission Objective -2, 'Reduce by 50% or 6,728 the number of inappropriate
Medicare admissions in 31 targeted DRGs.'
192
Objectives stated in such terms sound very much like quotas. They have raised
serious questions in the medical community as to whether pursuit of such numerical
objectives could result in patients needing hospitalization being refused admission,
186 42 U.S.C. § 1320c- 3(1) provides:
The organization shall review some or all of the professional activities in the area . . .for
the purpose of determining whether:
(A) such services and items are or were reasonable and medically necessary or other-
wise allowable ... ;
(B) the quality of such services meets professionally recognized standards of care; and
(C) in case such services and items are proposed to be provided in a hospital or
other health care facility on an inpatient basis, such services and items could, consistent with
the provision of appropriate medical care, be effectively provided on an outpatient basis or
in an inpatient health care facility of a different type.
Id.
137 See Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 39 (testimony of Pat Hanson, Hospital
DRG coordinator; at 97 (testimony of American Hospital Association). See generally, Dans, supra note 17.
I Id. at 50 (statement of Martin Kappert, Acting Assoc. Administrator for Operations, HCFA)
(emphasis added).
"9 HCFA Contract with Missouri Patient Care Foundation, Objective #3, reprinted in Sustaining
Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 89-90. This was later modified to read "Reduce unnecessary
admissions Statewide by 65,324." Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
"' Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 88 (letter from Rep. Ike Skelton, citing Missouri
Hospital Association).
... Id. at 90. These include at least Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Nebraska, Iowa, Kentucky,
Puerto Rico, South Dakota, Louisiana, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Wyoming, and there may be others.
191 Id. at 92.
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or in hospitals not being paid if such patients are admitted, because the admission
was not an approved one. 93
Spokesmen for HCFA contend that only unnecessary admissions are being
targeted. 94 However, the utilization objectives lend themselves easily to quantifica-
tion, thereby taking on an air of objectivity which quality objectives may not possess.
Moreover, some of the "quality" objectives being included in PRO contracts are
more readily characterized as utilization objectives. For example, among the
"quality" objectives PRO contracts include are "reduction of unnecessary hospital
readmissions resulting from substandard care" and "reduction of unnecessary
surgery or other invasive procedures."'
95
It is certainly true that "less" is sometimes better. Reducing unnecessary pro-
cedures may in fact improve quality of care by reducing patients' exposure to harm
from them. Nevertheless, a monitoring program that concerns itself primarily with
quantifiable measures of utilization is incomplete. HCFA and PROs need to develop
procedures for quality review and then to implement these in addition to the quan-
titative utilization measures that now predominate.'96
PROs are subject to contract renewal periodically.' 97 These renewals will be
based on the PRO's performance of its contract. Given the nature of bureaucratic
procedure, a PRO's performance is very likely to be evaluated on the basis of the
degree to which the contracts' numerical goals are attained. Under present
administration policy this evaluation will be based on a cost-benefit analysis.' 99
If the PRO reports, for example, that it reduced Medicare admissions by 1,000
and the DRG payment is $4,000, the PRO will have saved the government
$4,000,000. If the PRO contract fee is $500,000 there will be a cost to benefit ratio
of 1 to 8.' 9 Obviously, on this basis the more that can be verified as having been
saved, the better the PRO's performance will be evaluated. Performance which
is not as easily measured in a quantitative manner (i.e., monitoring of quality of
care) is likely to become obscured under this methodology. 29
" Brinkley, Experts Question Program to Cut Hospital Deaths, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1984, at
25, Col. 1.
"' Sustaining Quality Health Care, supra note 18, at 50-51 (statement of Martin Kappert, Acting
Associate Administrator for Operations, HCFA).
Id. at 50.
,96 See id. at 98 (testimony of Andrew Webber, Executive Vice-President, American Medical Peer
Review Association):
Unfortunately, much work needs to be done and research dollars devoted to developing the
outcome instruments for quality review. This effort must include the development of generic
quality screens; severity indices; clinical trials; and an integration of inpatient and outpatient
data bases so patient encounters can be tracked over time.
Id. at 98.
50 Fed. Reg. 15,328 (1985) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 462.107) (1984).
See E.O. 12,291, Feb. 17, 1981; Schnitzer, Physicians and Prospective Payment, 6 WHITTIER
L. REV. 863, 866 (1984).
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4. Preclusion of Review
Another aspect of PPS/DRG with implications for both access to quality care
and equitable payment to hospitals is the extent to which providers and beneficiaries
can obtain administrative or judicial review of perceived inequities in the system.
Review procedures may affect beneficiary access by permitting hospitals to force
changes in Medicare reimbursement methodology. As shown previously, changes
in reimbursement methodology directly affect the complement of services offered
by hospitals and thereby modify access to those services by the relevant popula-
tion. Judicial and administrative review are directly related to the goal of equitable
payment to hospitals since such review is a vehicle for the correction of perceived
inequities.
Although providing a judicial forum for the articulation of complaints sounds
fair, Congress has a long history of limiting judicial review of Social Security and
Medicare ratemaking methodology."0 ' Providers and beneficiaries have been equally
consistent in attacking these limitations in federal court.2"2 The PPS provision
limiting review, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(7), 0 3 adds a new dimension to the issue
because rather than the usual statute ensuring exhaustion of administrative remedies,
subsection (d)(7) appears to completely preclude both administrative and judicial
review of DRG weights, rates, and methodology.
The following discussion explores the possibility of a judicial assault on subsec-
tion (d)(7) and assesses its likelihood of success. Since the United States Supreme
Court has clearly permitted Congress to preclude review of rights derived from
statutes,2"" any attack on subsection (d)(7) would have to be based on denial of
constitutional rights. The main issues in such a challenge would include: who are
potential plaintiffs; whether Congress actually intended subsection (d)(7) to preclude
all review, including review of constitutional claims; whether Congress has the
authority to preclude review of constitutional questions; and the merits of a
constitutional attack against DRGs.
a. Plaintiffs and Intent to Preclude. Although a constitutional challenge to
subsection (d)(7) and DRGs has only a slight chance of success, there are at least
three possible plaintiffs in such a suit. First, a hospital on the verge of bankruptcy
202 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), 1395ii, 1995oo, 1395ww(d)(7) (1983).
202 E.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, (1974), Weinburger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, (1975),
Hechler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984), Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Michigan, 757 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1985).
203 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(7) (1983) provides:
(7) There shall be no administrative or judicial review under section 1878 [42 U.S.C.S. §
139500] or otherwise of-
(A) the determination of the requirement, or the proportional amount, of any adjust-
ment effected pursuant to subsection (e)(l), and
(B) the establishment of diagnosis-related groups, of the methodology for the classifica-
tion of discharges within such groups, and of the appropriate weighting factors thereof under
paragraph (4).
204 See Weinberger 422 U.S. 749.
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might blame DRG rates for its financial plight and allege that DRGs as implemented
violate some constitutional right of the hospital. Second, an individual beneficiary
who deems himself wronged as a result of DRG implementation could seek damages
or equitable relief. Third, a hospital accused of malpractice by a private plaintiff
might implead HHS and allege that the extreme pressure of DRGs, not the hospital
itself, caused the plaintiff's injury. Any or all of these plaintiffs would still be re-
quired to show clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent to preclude
review, lack of congressional authority to preclude, a substantive violation of a
constitutional right by DRGs, and relevant damages.
Although there are not many cases addressing Congressional authority to
preclude judicial review, there is a line of cases construing the limited judicial review
provisions of social welfare programs. " 5 These cases establish that courts will con-
strue limited review statutes narrowly in order to avoid reaching the question of
Congressional authority to preclude review. The standard is whether the legislative
history contains "clear and convincing" evidence of Congressional intent to preclude
review.106 Consequently, the first thing a court would do in a case brought against
DRGs and defended on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as a result of subsection
(d)(7), would be to analyze the legislative history of subsection (d)(7) for clear and
convincing evidence of intent to remove jurisdiction.
The express terms of subsection (d)(7) suggest a clear intent to preclude review.
The statute unequivocally states that: "[t]here shall be no ... review. . . ." Although
the simplicity of this language does not immediately suggest any ambiguity, it could
be argued that the absence of a clear statement extending preclusion to constitu-
tional claims is sufficiently vague to justify jurisdiction. Though this argument seems
strained, it conceivably could be acceptable to a court which is narrowly construing
a statute in order to preserve a right to review. Intention to preclude is further
supported by the fact that the prohibition on review extends to both "administrative
or judicial" remedies. Prohibition of both avenues of relief implies that subsection
(d)(7) is more than an exhaustion of remedies statute. The section also appears
to cover both provider and beneficiary claims due to its preclusion of review under
"§ 1395oo of this title or otherwise. . . ." The inclusion of "or otherwise" sug-
gests that all other bases of review are as precluded as 1395oo remedies.
As to the subject areas precluded, subsection (d)(7)(A), limits review of section
1395ww(e)(1) issues. Section 1395ww(e)(1) requires the Secretary of HHS, inter alia,
to limit annual adjustments in PPS rates to maintain budget neutrality. Subsection
(d)(7)(B) appears to preclude challenges to the decision to use DRGs ("Itihe establish-
ment of diagnosis-related groups"), the methodology for using DRGs as a basis
for prospective payment, and the accuracy of any weighting factor assigned to any
DRG. Consequently subsection (d)(7)(B) appears to preclude any attack on DRGs
at all. Viewed in totality, the express terms of the statute do appear to intend preclu-
"', See supra note 202.
206 Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 757 F.2d 91; National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies
v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983).
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sion. The best argument a plaintiff could make to deny such intent is the absence
of an express prohibition on constitutional claims.
Analysis of the legislative history of PPS/DRG corroborates the conclusion
that subsection (d)(7) is a conscious executive and legislative effort to preclude
administrative and judicial review of any challenge to using DRGs as a method
for paying hospitals. The first explanation of the intent and scope of what was
to become subsection (d)(7) was given by Secretary Schweiker.
Retroactive adjustment of the payment rates, as might result from judicial review,
is inimical to the basic purpose of a prospective system. Moreover, the delays inherent
in the judicial process, when coupled with the likelihood of annual revisions in
the rates of payment, could lead to chaotic results, in which rates for a previous
period may be overturned by a court, or remanded to the Department for further
consideration, even though different rates had superseded the contested rates.2 °7
As for Congress, the only reference to judicial review in the House Report
states that "Paragraph (7) of that subsection prohibits administrative review
(including review by the Provider Reimbursement Review Board) and any form
of judicial review of the Secretary's establishment (including classification methods
and weighting factors) of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).' ' 208
The Senate Report similarly states that
With respect to administrative and judicial review, your Committee's bill would
permit review except in the narrow cases necessary to maintain budget neutrality
and avoid adversely affecting the establishment of the diagnosis related groups,
the methodology for the classification of discharges within such groups, and the
appropriate weighting of such groups ...
Thus, it is your Committee's intent that a hospital would not be permitted
to argue that the level of the payment which it receives under the system is inade-
quate to cover its costs ...
Your Committee bill precludes review of the establishment, methodology
and weighting of diagnosis related groups because of the complexity of such action
and the necessity of maintaining a workable payment system. Thus, neither the
definition of the different diagnosis related groups, their weights in relation to each
other, nor the method used to assign discharges to one of the groups would be
reviewable.
20 9
The Conference Report also affirms preclusion by stating that the bill "per-
mits administrative and judicial review in all cases except the narrow items necessary
to maintain budget neutrality: (1) the level of the payment amount, and (2) the
establishment of the DRG classifications." t ' Research has indicated no floor debate
on the issue of judicial review.
200 PPS REPORT supra note 4, at 41.
205 H. Rep. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1983 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 219.
209 S. Rep. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1983 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 143.
",0 Conf. Rpt. No. 47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1983 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 404.
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Since the express terms and legislative history of subsection (d)(7) contain strong
evidence of intent to preclude and since no countervailing theory appears credible,
it appears that reviewing courts would likely find clear and convincing evidence
of intent to preclude review.
b. Constitutionality of Preclusion. Assuming there were clear and convincing
evidence of Congress' intent to preclude all administrative and judicial review of
DRG methodology and rates, the next question a plaintiff would face is whether
Congress can constitutionally preclude such review. Arguments about the authority
to preclude review are based, not on the due process clause, but on Article III,
Section 2, the "exceptions clause." The exceptions clause gives the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction in all cases "both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." Although the United States
Supreme Court has never directly construed the extent of the exceptions power,
courts and eminent commentators have been discussing the issue for many years.2 ''
Indeed there seems little one can add to the literature concerning preclusion and
this article makes no attempt to do so. Suffice it to say that reasonable persons
differ on whether the breadth of the Congressional exceptions power permits com-
plete preclusion of administrative and judicial review.
Since such preclusion is arguably beyond the scope of the exceptions power
and since courts will narrowly construe the terms of any preclusion statute, it is
not beyond the pale of reason to assume, at least for academic purposes, that a
suit challenging PPS/DRG and subsection (d)(7) may survive a motion to dismiss.
Such a suit's chances for survival, however, depend on the existence of an underly-
ing constitutional violation independent of the constitutionality of subsection (d)(7).
The following discussion explores some arguments institutional and individual plain-
2. See Constitutional Restraints Upon the Judiciary: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
sititution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Judiciary
Hearings]; Gunther & Berger, Congressional Contraction of Federal Jurisdiction, 33 OR. L. REV. 1
(1973); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970);
Forkosch, The Exceptions & Regulations Clause of Article III and A Person's Constitutional Rights:
Can the Latter be Limited by Congressional Power Under the Former?, 72 W. VA. L. REV. 238 (1970);
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv. 929 (1981-82); Ratner, Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Redish, Con-
stitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Pro-
fessor Sager, 77 Nw. L. REV. 143 (1982); Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court
Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL.
L. REV. 900, 911 (1981-82); Sager, Foreward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); symposium: Congres-
sional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 893 (1982) (contributions by Bator, Ratner,
Redish, Rice, Baucus & Kay, and McClellan); Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored
Rights OUt of the Federal COurts, 16 HAiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981); Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Ex Pare McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965).
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tiffs might make in attempts to overturn PPS/DRG on its merits and return to
the retrospective payment of Medicare costs.
c. Constitutionality of DRGs. Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that subsec-
tion (d)(7) is clear and convincing evidence of Congressional intent to preclude any
review and even if the plaintiff proves that Congress lacks the power to preclude
review, the plaintiff would not have been damaged unless he could prove that DRGs
violate a constitutional right. Although a number of arguments present themselves,
none is compelling. Institutional plaintiffs can argue violations of substantive due
process, equal protection, and confiscation while individuals may argue loss of due
process rights to life.
Any attack on PPS must be on constitutional grounds because Weinberger v.
Salf establishes Congressional power to preclude review of mere statutory rights."'2
This line of cases does not, however, extend to preclude review of constitutional
claims. Therefore, a DRG plaintiff must prove violation of an underlying constitu-
tional right in order to get a remedy. This violation must stem from the DRG
methodology itself; merely showing that preclusion is invalid will be insufficient
to overturn DRGs as a basis for payment.
The first argument an institutional plaintiff could make is that the use of DRGs,
as opposed to the preclusion of review, violates equal protection. This argument
is the modern reincarnation of the moribund doctrine of substantive due process.
Substantive due process is moribund because it has been relegated to the "hell"
of the rational relation test. Substantive due process arguments are based on the
premise that regulation unreasonably deprives the regulated of liberty or property
interests."1 3 The demise of substantive due process occurred as the Supreme Court
gradually decided that economic regulation which is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest is constitutionally permissible."" Thus federal courts employ
essentially the same test for substantive due process claims as they do for many
equal protection claims.
The modern Supreme Court has not retreated from the rational relation test.
Indeed only one recent case in the Supreme Court has been able to strike down
an economic regulation, Morey v. Doud.*I5 The Morey Court invalidated a grand-
father clause as "irrational." Nineteen years later, Morey was overruled by City
of New Orleans v. Dukes."'6 Dukes also considered the validity of a seemingly
arbitrary grandfather clause. The Supreme Court held "that the equal protection
analysis employed in [the Morey opinion] should no longer be followed. Morey
was the only case in the last half century to invalidate a wholly economic regula-
Weinburger, 422 U.S. 749.
213 See, e.g., Chicago, Milw. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
427 U.S. 297 (1976).
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tion solely on equal protection grounds, and we are now satisfied that the decision
was erroneous."
2 1 7
Possibly the closest case to a PPS case is In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.21 8
In Permian the federal government had imposed maximum price levels for dif-
ferent types of natural gas. High cost producers complained about the rates. The
Permian Court held that the rates were not arbitrary and discriminatory and abridged
no constitutional right.
No constitutional objection arises from the imposition of maximum prices merely
because "high cost operators may be more seriously affected than others" . . .
or because the value of regulated property is reduced as a consequence of regula-
tion .... Regulation may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the
return recovered on investment, for investors' interests provide only one of the
variables in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness.
21 9
The Permian price structure is analogous to the mandatory maximum prices imposed
by PPS/DRG. As in Permian a PPS/DRG plaintiff is also likely to be a high cost
provider unable to keep his costs within DRG rates.
PPS/DRG plaintiffs arguing equal protection or substantive due process would
need to marshall facts to show a lack of rational relation. Possible facts to emphasize
would be hospital closures as indicative of reduced quality of service, the fact that
past government policies, i.e. retrospective payment, created an economic addiction
that could not be rationally removed cold turkey, and reference to any negative
epidemiological effects incurred under PPS/DRG. However in light of Dukes, even
proof of these facts would probably be insufficient to overturn PPS/DRG.220
A second argument that a plaintiff could make is that DRG payment rates
are confiscatory in violation of the fifth amendment guarantee of just compensa-
tion. The analysis to assess whether a publicly imposed rate is confiscatory is set
forth in Bowles v. Willingham.2 ' Bowles upheld a wartime rent regulation as the
rational exercise of government emergency powers. The Bowles scheme was deemed
not confiscatory in part because participation in the program was not mandatory
and in part because procedural devices for individualized relief were available. The
Bowles standard was clarified in Permian. The Permian Court held that rates are
not confiscatory if the rate-makers apply the standards mandated in the appropriate
legislation. 22 In Permian, for example, the rates had to be "just and reasonable." '23
PPS/DRG plaintiffs will have to distinguish their case from Bowles and Per-
mian. Although participation in Medicare is voluntary, plaintiffs can distinguish
2I Id. at 306.
233 In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Permian].
Id. at 769 (quoting Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
223 Dukes, 427 U.S. 297.
22 Bowles, 321 U.S. 503.
222 Permian, 390 U.S. at 770.
223 Id. at 767.
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themselves from other regulated industries by arguing that the size of Medicare
makes participation a practical necessity and, therefore, constructively mandatory.
A plaintiff would also have to argue that PPS/DRG provides only limited relief for
individual cases. However HHS can rebut this claim by noting that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(b)(4)(A) provides the requisite emergency relief by permitting the Secret-
ary of HHS to make exceptions to payment methods in extraordinary circumstances.
If a plaintiff can convince a court that Medicare is mandatory and PPS/DRG
precludes "special relief" from group rates, then PPS/DRG is distinguishable from
Bowles.
There are two additional obstacles to the confiscation argument. First, there
is a long line of cases holding government benefits not to be property rights entitl-
ing former beneficiaries to compensation for changes in benefits. 2 4 Institutional
plaintiffs can attempt to distinguish their case as a provider's receipt of contractual
payments rather than a beneficiary's receipt of benefits. 2,5 The second obstacle is
that DRG rates will be upheld as long as they conform to the "reasonable cost"
or "customary charges" standards imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b)(1). Since DRG
rates are by definition aggregates of actual costs, it will be difficult to prove that
a specific rate is unreasonable. Even a successful condemnation of a single rate
would be a pyrrhic victory. This is because the damages from condemning one
rate would probably be insufficient to alleviate the severe financial problems which
would have prompted a plaintiff to pursue adjudicatory rather than legislative
remedies in the first place. The difficulties in proving one rate unreasonable would
be exponentially increased in any attempt to show that the entire DRG methodology
is unreasonable. Consequently, the confiscation argument is unlikely to be successful.
Individual plaintiffs may make equal protection and due process arguments
in attempts to obtain damages for a death or injury perceived as attributable to
PPS/DRG. Even assuming that subsection (d)(7) is unconstitutional, an individual
making a constitutional claim against DRGs would probably be required to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. This exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies would even apply to constitutional claims, because the remedy requested
indicates that the claim arose out of Medicare and such claims have been held sub-
ject to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) review under the case of Heckler v. Ringer.
2 2 6
The necessary precursor to any individual claim against DRGs would be some
aggregate evidence tending to show that the method of payment is causing injury
as opposed to the method of treatment. One would have to show, for example,
increases in morbidity or mortality occurring in conjunction with PPS/DRG's
implementation.227 The following discussion therefore assumes the availability of
negative empirical data.
2, See, e.g., Jones v. Reagan, 748 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1984); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960).
2 Federal Power Comm'n. v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1943).
226 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
21' As of the time this is written there is no statistically significant evidence of impaired health status
attributable directly to PPS/DRG.
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Individual plaintiffs can try to argue deprivation of equal protection and loss
of the due process right to life. The only difference between the institutional and
individual equal protection arguments is that the individuals have at least a chance
to obtain elevated scrutiny. Under normal circumstances individual plaintiffs are
not members of a suspect class and will consequently fall into the rational relation
abyss. 228 The fact that Medicare is primarily a program for the aged will not help
individual plaintiffs because the Supreme Court has held that the aged are not a
suspect class. 220 The poor have also been denied suspect classification.
230
Women could attempt to obtain scrutiny of PPS rates under the substantial
relation test.2 3 ' It could be argued that since the vast majority of Medicare
beneficiaries are women,23 2 any decline in quality of care for the aged will dispropor-
tionately affect women. The government can defend against allegations of discrimina-
tion by emphasizing the fact that PPS/DRG benefits are identical for men and
women with the same DRG. Although no equal protection case has required that
discrimination be overt, the equality of PPS rates regardless of gender will prob-
ably be persuasive on any question of substantial relation. In summary, despite
the fact that many parties are concerned that PPS/DRG will overburden public
hospitals and impair the quality of care delivered to poor people,2 3 courts will
analyze individual complaints under the rational relation test.
The final argument an individual plaintiff can make is that the health care
provided by Medicare is a fundamental right derived from the due process right
to life. A plaintiff making this argument would need to show first, that PPS/DRG
was responsible for the injury, and second, that personal health is contained in
the right to life. The Ninth Circuit case of Jones v. Reagan234 has recently cir-
cumvented the question of whether medical care is a fundamental right. Jones in-
volved the elimination of free medical care provided to seamen at United States
Public Health Service hospitals. The seamen argued that medical care is a fun-
damental right subjecting the removal of benefits to the compelling state interest
test. The Court avoided ruling on whether medical care is a fundamental right by
holding that nothing in the removal of benefits impaired the plaintiffs' right to
access to private medical care and that, as long as the seamen's access rights to
health care were the same as other private citizens, no discrimination existed to
submit to strict scrutiny even if medical care were a fundamental right.
[T]he seamen are in no different position with regard to access to medical care
than many other American citizens. Because the seamen have not been denied equal
"' See generally, Sager, supra note 211, at 78-79.
"' Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
110 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
23 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating
gender based social security classification).
"I Waldo and Lazenby, Demographic Characteristics and Health Care Use and Expenditures by
the Aged in the United States; 1977-84, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
23 See supra notes 156-163 and text accompanying.
23 Jones, 748 F.2d at 1338.
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access to medical care, we need not decide whether equal access to medical care
is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny for purposes of constitutional
review. 21
Medicare beneficiaries could easily distinguish the Jones reasoning from their
own circumstances. First, since the entire discussion of this issue is predicated on
the existence of negative health effects associated with PPS/DRG, plaintiffs can
use this evidence to show collective decreased access to the quality health care they
were receiving before PPS/DRG was implemented. Second, as long as the private
insurance industry continues to pay retrospective benefits, medicare recipients will
not have equal access with the privately insured. Third, plaintiffs can argue that
their right is to health, not medical care, and that any public program which know-
ingly decreases health status violates that right.
HHS will probably defend against individual claims by entering a numbers battle
and by arguing that elderly access to medical care is comparatively greater than
the rest of the population so that no discrimination exists. Another defense would
be that in an era of finite resources, public decisions to apportion benefits are per
se reasonable. This defense was successful in Dandridge v. Williams236 and would
probably prevail in these circumstances as well.
It therefore appears that there are no compelling constitutional arguments against
PPS/DRG. Consequently it appears that obtaining adjudicatory solutions to cur-
rent hospital financial pressure will be difficult: PPS/DRG appears to be immun-
ized by subsection (d)(7).
This immunity fits precisely into the scheme of PPS/DRG. Prospective rates
which can be retroactively adjusted by a court can never be relied on by hospitals
to constitute complete payment. As long as the possibility for supplemental pay-
ment to hospitals exists, the economizing incentives implicit in PPS/DRG are diluted.
Consequently, although the provisions of subsection (d)(7) may be harsh, they are
a necessary component of a prospectively based health care financing system.
III. CONCLUSION-A BROADER ISSUE
All of the foregoing suggests a broader issue, namely the permeation of economic
and business concepts such as cost-benefit analysis into the health care field.237
"I Id. at 1337.
26 Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471.
I" See Avorn, Benefit and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care, 310 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1294 (1984);
Levey & Hesse, Botton Line Health Care 312 NEw ENO. J. MED. 644 (1985); Relman, Economic Consid-
erations in Emergency Care, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 372 (1985); ,Vrenn, No Insurance, No Admission
312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 373 (1985); Freedman, Megacorporate Health Care, 312 NEW ENO. J. MED.
579 (1985); Stone, Law's Influence on Medicare and Medical Ethics, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309 (1985).
See generally, S. WOHL, THE MEDICAL-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1984); THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN TIHE
MID-1990S (study conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. for the Health Insurance Association of America,
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This development has been both rapid and far-reaching. For example, the Hospital
Literature Index did not even include the subject "Marketing of Health Services"
until 1979, and "Economic Competition" made its first appearance in 1982.238 By
that time the language of business had begun to displace that of medicine. Patients
became "customers" and physicians were "members of the hospital sales force." 3 9
Today the "monetarization""24 of health care proceeds apace and the jargon of
business and economics has become commonplace.2 '
Certainly, the increased cost consciousness on the part of those involved in
health care that is among the prime contributors to this rapid change in perspective
was long overdue.2 42 It undeniably has produced many beneficial results. For too
long the aspect of cost had been virtually ignored by those involved with health
care. However, when it became a matter of public concern, at the onset of the
1980s, that health care was consuming an ever-increasing share of the gross national
product'24 the philosophical emphasis began to shift dramatically toward cost con-
tainment away from assuring widespread access to quality care.244 Medical care
costs have slackened in recent years. 45 But the question remains whether the shift
to an economic model may be carried too far.
There is a tendency among at least some economists to emphasize maximiza-
tion of production to the detriment of other non-quantifiable values such as equitable
distribution of goods. 46 However, the question of who is to receive what health
care is a moral as well as an economic issue.24 7 Precisely because this is a difficult
moral issue, there is a dangerous tendency to finesse it by retreating to the safety
of the hard science of economics, especially when a questioning of economic analyses
1985); HEALTH CARE IN THE 1990s: TRENDS AND STRATEGIES (study conducted by Arthur Anderson
& Co. for American College of Hospital Administrators, 1985); Thurow, Medicine versus Economics,
313 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 611 (1985).
"' Levey & Hesse, supra note 237, at 644.
239 Id.
240 See Ginzberg, The Monetarization of Medical Care, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1162 (1984).
"Monetarization" refers to the rapid penetration of the money economy into all facets of the health
care system. A striking illustration of this phenomenon is a marked decline in hospital philanthropy
over the years. In 1940, philanthropy constituted 247o of a non-profit hospital's budget; today philan-
thropy accounts for 1076 of those budgets. Id.
2I See, e.g., Christianson, Competitive Bidding: The Challenge for Health Care Managers, 1985
HCM Review 39.
'41 Levey & Hesse, supra note 237, at 644.
214 See Philipps & Wineberg, supra note 1, at 13.
2,4 See Dunmeyer & Herda, Implications of Hospital Cost Control for Administration, 1985 HCM
Review 29, 31-33. Kapp, Legal and Ethical Implications of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagnosis
Related Groups, 1984 Law, Medicine and Health Care 245; Malloy and Skinner, Medicare on the Critical
List, HARV. Bus. REV. 122 (1984) (brief history of developments leading to increased cost consciousness).
2I See supra notes 5-22 and accompanying text. See generally, Balfe, Boyle, Brocki and Lane,
A Health Policy Agenda for the American People, 254 J. AM. MED. A. 2440 (1985).
246 See, e.g., R. RICARDO-CAPBELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE 29-35 (1982).
247 See Dunmeyer & Herda, supra note 244, at 33-34.
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is considered by some a sign of ignorance." 8 As has been pointed out there is
"something very seductive about quantification. ' 24 9
Health care managers want to be viewed as effective in their tasks. The quan-
tified bottom line provides a tangible means of evaluating their performance.2
°
Likewise, placing the onus for controlling costs on the health care profession itself
permits public policy-makers to shift some of the burden of making the hard moral
choices away from themselves.25'
Even where changes directed toward cost control, such as PPS/DRG, are
effective in attaining that goal, they may present a danger of "diffusing ethical
responsibility," and adversely "affecting the doctor-patient relationship. 22 These
are not necessary results of attention to cost containment, but to avoid them we
must remember always that "we live in a society not an economy."",
This is not to disparage health care cost control in general nor PPS/DRG in
particular. Rather, it is a warning against an over-emphasis on cost control to the
detriment of other values in health care and a caution against stressing cost control
under PPS/DRG to the neglect of access to quality care. Proposals to freeze the
DRG rates21" are a signal that cost control may be predominating to a detrimental
extreme. This harsh, stingy approach could doom PPS/DRG before it has ever
had a chance to prove itself. Payment rates under PPS/DRG must be adequate
if its beneficial aspects are to be fully achieved. PPS/DRG can be administered
either to provide an adequate amount of money for hospitals to operate efficiently,
or it can be administered to squeeze them dry, with consequent detrimental effects
on access to quality health care. 55 It is to be hoped that the former course is chosen.
2S Levey & Hesse, supra note 237, at 645.
"' Fein, Social and Economic Attitudes: Shaping American Health Policy, 58 MILBANK MEM.
FUND Q. 349, 370 (1980). This issue of quantification has been recognized beyond the health care in-
dustry. The Wall St. J. Editorial page quoted Norman Lear, speaking at a Security Industry Associa-
tion meeting in 1984, " . . .this stunted number based mentality impoverished our understanding of
the world because non-quantifiable facts of life are screened out." Wall St. J., August 1, 1985, at 16.
250 Levey & Hesse, supra note 237, at 644.
"' See Mariner, Diagnosis Related Groups: Evading Social Responsibility? 1984 Law Medicine
and Health Care 243; Stone, supra note 237, at 310. In this regard it is significant that while Congress
has consistently passed laws stressing cost-containment such as the TEFRA limits on Medicare reim-
bursement, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ww, (West Supp. 1984), when the bureaucrats at HCFA have responded
in kind with an equally tightfisted attitude toward administration, Congressmen have decried HCFA's
actions. See, e.g., Sustaining Quality Health Care, Supra note 18, at 1-2 (statement by Edward R.
Roybal, Chairman, House Select Committee on Aging); Id. at 2-3 (statement by Mike Synar, Chairman
of House Select Committee on Aging Task Force on the Rural Elderly).
212 Stone, supra note 237, at 310.
I" Avorn, supra note 237, at 1297, quoting R. FEIN, ON MEASURING ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HEALTH
PROGRAMIES IN MEDICAL HISTORY AND MEDICAL CARE: A SYMPOSIUM OF PERSPECTIVES 179-220, (1971).
"' See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 24,392-98 (June 10, 1985); J. O'SuLLIvAN, MEDICARE-FY 1986 BUDGET,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. ISSUE BRIEF IB85047 at CRS-9 (updated Mar. 3, 1985).
255 Thompson, Book Review, 9 J. HEALTH, POLmcs, POLICY, AND LAW 717, 719 (1985). (Review-
ing [THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: THE EVOLUTION OF DRG RATE REGULATION IN NEW JERSEY]).
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